## aff answers

### 2ac – at: courts ban the plan

#### CP’s struck down – Leahy Law suits are virtually impossible – sovereign immunity, political question, OR standing doctrine causes dismissal OR non-enforcement – NO spillover

Nathanael Tenorio Miller 12, J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013. "Note: The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences." Cornell International Law Journal, 45, 667, pp. 692-694, Fall, 2012, Lexis, nihara

VIII. Judicial Barriers to Enforcement

In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has made it virtually impossible for anyone to sue to enforce the Leahy Law. Any challenge to the Leahy Law is likely to fail because of sovereign immunity, 249 because enforcement is a political question, 250 or because any conceivable plaintiffs would lack standing. 251

Iran-Contra presents a good indication of what would happen if foreign citizens tried challenging the Leahy Law. In Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, when twelve citizens of Nicaragua sued for redress of injuries to themselves by the Contras, then-Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia barred the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds. 252 Scalia said:

It would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity if federal courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by judgments nominally against present or former Executive officers, actions that are, concededly and as a jurisdictional necessity, official actions of the United States. Such judgments would necessarily "interfere with the public administration," or "restrain the government from acting, or … compel it to act." These consequences are tolerated when the officer's action is unauthorized because contrary to statutory or constitutional prescription, but we think that exception can have no application when the basis for jurisdiction requires action authorized by the sovereign as opposed to private wrongdoing… .

… The support for military operations that we are asked to terminate has, if the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, received the attention and approval of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA, and involves the conduct of our diplomatic relations with at least four foreign states … . 253

More recently, in Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit said that it "has recognized 'the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive … . Thus, unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.'" 254

Moreover, in Goldwater v. Carter, the Supreme Court ruled that the authority to terminate treaties is a political question and therefore non-justiciable. 255 In his concurrence, Justice Powell said "the Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse." 256 While there have been systemic flaws that lead to the lack of enforcement of the Leahy Law, given the deference to the Executive on matters of foreign policy, it is highly unlikely to lead to a constitutional impasse.

Nor do Members of Congress have standing to sue. In Raines v. Byrd, the Supreme Court denied Members of Congress the ability to challenge laws based upon a diminution of congressional power. 257 The Court said that, "appellees have alleged no injury to themselves as individuals, the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed, and their attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to historical experience." 258

With respect to the Leahy Law itself, a District Court gave two reasons in denying Representative Kucinich's suit to stop U.S. military action in Libya that cut against any congressional suits to enforce the Leahy Law. The first was the ability of the legislators to seek a legislative remedy, 259 and the second was congressional action, 260 in this case voting against de-funding the Libyan intervention. Since a legislative remedy to a lack of enforcement of the Leahy Law is theoretically available and there have been successive appropriations bills passed that have had the effect of funding the military units at issue, it is highly unlikely that a suit brought by Members of Congress will survive a challenge.

Due to the difficulty in tracking FMF to a particular unit, and therefore the impossibility of demonstrating that the U.S. arms and training were the cause of a specific injury, it is similarly unlikely that other groups of plaintiffs will have standing to sue. The Supreme Court ruled, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, that unless a citizen has been personally injured "standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest … which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share." 261 Further, in United States v. Richardson, the Supreme Court ruled that taxpayers did not have standing to sue because "to invoke judicial power the claimant must have a 'personal stake in the outcome,' or a 'particular, concrete injury,' or 'a direct injury,' in short, something more than 'generalized grievances.'" 262 However, the possibility of any plaintiff meeting these requirements is de minimis.

Due to sovereign immunity and the political question and standing doctrines, the Judiciary cannot check presidential violations of the Leahy Law. Without Congress clearly articulating a cause of action, the courts will continue to bar any potential plaintiffs from seeking a judicial remedy. It is up to Congress, not the courts, to give strength to the Leahy Law.

### 2ac – at: nb – squo solves

#### Status quo solves the internal net benefit

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FIRST IN NATSEC DAILY — LEAHY LAW LOOPHOLE: Rep. SARA JACOBS (D-Calif.) and Sen. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN (D-Md.) have introduced the “Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act” to close a gap in the Leahy Law — which prohibits the Defense Department and the State Department from providing military assistance to foreign security forces that violate human rights.

Specifically, the bill by Jacobs and Van Hollen would require human rights vetting for a pair of the Pentagon’s security cooperation programs — “Section 127e” and “Section 1202” — that have drawn scrutiny in open-source reporting by the Intercept and other media outlets.

“Human rights vetting is an essential part of how we engage with other countries, but over the last two decades Section 127e and Section 1202 have skirted these vetting requirements and, in some cases, been used with partners who have consistently violated human rights,” Jacobs said in a statement. “United States support for unvetted human rights abusers is not only deeply immoral and irresponsible, it is also counterproductive, leading to more unrest, instability, and terrorist activity.”

Van Hollen added in his own statement: “[F]or too long, legal loopholes have allowed the Department of Defense to bypass proper vetting, reporting, and oversight protocols when providing other nations or groups with certain types of military assistance.”

Sen. PATRICK LEAHY (D-Vt.), for whom the Leahy Law is named, said in a statement that the Pentagon “should have closed this loophole on its own initiative. The Upholding Human Rights Abroad Act will ensure that the Leahy Law is applied uniformly, so foreign partners are vetted and those who violate human rights are excluded from these programs.”

### 2ac – leahy law bad – egypt turn

#### Egypt violates human rights – the CP would decisively cut aid – OR, it doesn’t solve the net benefit

Ibrahim Ali 20, Fall 2020, “Note: Beyond Credible Fear: Enforcement of the Leahy Law and the Role the Asylum System Should Play,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 35, 235, pp. 241-244, Lexis, nihara

A. Egypt

Despite its human rights record, Egypt is one of the biggest recipients of U.S. aid. A lower middle-income country, Egypt received $ 1.25 billion in U.S. foreign assistance in FY2018. 40Of that amount, $ 1 billion went towards foreign military financing. 41Over the last 70 years, it has received over $ 80 billion in U.S. foreign assistance, 42and it has requested $ 1.38 billion for FY 2020. 43While it remains a key foreign aid recipient, Egypt's human rights record is disturbing. 44

The Egyptian state has tortured suspects, implemented mass trials against children, and executed detainees. In January 2002, Mr. Ahmad El-Maati, a falsely accused terrorist suspect, was tortured by Egyptian security officials:

[a]n electric prod was used on [El-Maati's] hands, legs and genitals during interrogations. His hands were cuffed so tightly that his wrists bled. . . . He was kept blindfolded and handcuffed in a hallway with other prisoners for what he estimates was about two weeks. It was during this time, Mr. El-Maati says, that he developed anal bleeding. Canadian doctors later diagnosed an anal fissure requiring surgery. 45

Since 2013, the Egyptian government's use of mass trials and death sentences against children have skyrocketed; these include death sentences issued by military courts 46-- the same military that has received billions of dollars in assistance from the U.S. government. 47The U.S.-based human rights organization, Belady, puts the number of children arrested by the current regime for political reasons at over 2,000. 48Since former General el-Sisi assumed office, Egypt has been among the ten countries with the highest numbers of executions per year. 49At an Arab-EU summit in 2019, el-Sisi stood by his government's actions, arguing that executing detainees is part of "our humanity," distinguishing it from "your [European] humanity." 50Yet, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution states that Islam is the official state religion and that the primary source of legislation is Sharia law. 51The Quran forbids unjust killing, including judicially mandated death sentences that lack due process. 52El-Sisi's use of "our humanity" as justification for mass trials, death sentences in absentia, and sham military trials should sound the alarms for a White House that claims to be sending aid to "those who respect us." 53

In April 2019, the Egyptian Constitution was amended to lengthen el-Sisi's term from four to six years and to allow him to run for an additional term, solidifying his ability to remain in power until 2030; it also gave him far greater control over the judicial branch. 54The fairness of the referendum on these amendments was widely criticized. Websites that encouraged people to vote "no" were blocked by the government, and Egyptian citizens living abroad were given very little notice to travel to a consulate to vote. 55

Between 2017 and 2019, the Egyptian government blocked over 600 news, political, and human rights websites without judicial authorization. 56It was also among the four worst countries for journalists in 2018, with twenty-five journalists arrested that year, nineteen of which detained for "spreading false news." 57In August 2020, Egypt's "special counterterrorism courts" sentenced in absentia Bahey eldin Hassan, a prominent human rights activist, to fifteen years in prison for criticizing President Sissi's regime on Twitter. 58

In May 2015, the State Department informed Congress that it was in the national interest to continue assisting Egypt, but it also highlighted many of the country's violations that year, writing: "Government forces have committed arbitrary or otherwise unlawful killings during dispersal of demonstrators, of persons in custody, and during military operations in the northern Sinai Peninsula." 59This was not an isolated incident. Public Law 115-141 states that of the $ 1.3 billion in assistance to Egypt, $ 300 million must be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking effective steps on various human rights. 60However, it also states that the Secretary may waive the certification requirement if he or she determines that doing so is important to the national security interest of the U.S. 61In August 2019, a year full of gross violations of human rights by the Egyptian government, Secretary Pompeo invoked the national security interest waiver. 62Judging by the broad power vested in the Secretary of State by the statute, it is fairly straightforward for the Secretary to override the recommendations of DRL officials and investigators on the ground at U.S. embassies abroad; he or she merely has to declare that it is in the national security interest of the U.S. to do so. 63

Despite Egypt's troubling track record (these are only a few examples), the Trump administration has been outspoken in its support of the Egyptian dictatorship. 64On April 3, 2017, President Trump welcomed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the White House. 65During an interview in the Oval Office, President Trump spoke highly of his Egyptian counterpart: "We are very much behind President el-Sisi. He's done a fantastic job . . . And I just want to say to you, Mr. President, that you have a great friend and ally in the United States and in me." 66Just eighteen days later, on April 21, 2017, President Trump welcomed to the White House Ms. Aya Hijazi, an Egyptian-American humanitarian worker who was incarcerated by el-Sisi's regime for three years without a trial. 67During the televised meeting, no mention was made of the Egyptian government's treatment of Ms. Hijazi, and the President refused to take any questions. 68Ironically, while in the Oval Office, she sat in the same chair that was occupied by her authoritarian persecutor eighteen days earlier. 69Furthermore, at the G7 Summit in France in September 2019, President Trump notoriously called out, "Where's my favorite dictator?" while awaiting a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart. 70"Egypt has a great leader, he's highly respected, he's brought order," President Trump said at a meeting with el-Sisi during the UN General Assembly in September 2019. 71That same week, el-Sisi's regime arrested more than 2,000 peaceful protesters throughout the country. 72

#### US-Egypt cooperation and funding of Suez canal maritime chokepoint operations is key to naval power projection AND crises response – AND, trade – collapses European, Asian, AND US economy – empowers China to imperil war reserves and cause naval crises

Brent Sadler 21, Brent D. Sadler is a senior fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, 4-12-2021, "What the Closing of the Suez Canal Says About U.S. Maritime Security," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-closing-suez-canal-says-about-us-maritime-security-182571>, nihara

The Ever Given wasn’t the first ship to block the Suez Canal. A multi-ship pile-up in 2018 snarled maritime traffic there for two days. But the sheer size and bulk of the Ever Given was a much greater challenge—one that took 11 days to solve.

As container ships grow ever more massive, it becomes increasingly difficult to clear accidents quickly in strategic waterways. This simple reality has troubling economic and military implications.

If a strategic maritime chokepoint such as the Suez Canal is closed, then how long can this be endured before the U.S. economy suffers serious damage? And is the Navy appropriately positioned and sized to contend with such closures?

When the Ever Given grounded on March 23, regional tensions had been high for months due to an undeclared tanker war between Iran and Israel. There were also mounting concerns over Russian military forces massing in Crimea and on Ukraine’s Eastern borders. To move forces quickly between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean, the U.S. Navy must have access to the Suez Canal. Without it, naval forces must circumnavigate Africa, taking over a week to arrive at a flashpoint.

On the day before Ever Given’s grounding, the Eisenhower carrier strike group (CSG) was in the Eastern Mediterranean conducting operations against ISIS (Islamic State in Syria and Iraq), while the Makin Island amphibious ready group was in the Arabian Sea. Had tensions turned to conflict in Ukraine while the canal was blocked, the nearest significant naval carrier strike force (the Theodore Roosevelt CSG) would have had to make a circuitous transit from the Indian Ocean—a danger acknowledged publicly by the Pentagon.

The Suez Canal closure created a 360-ship traffic jam and disrupted almost 13 percent of global maritime trade. In addition to creating added costs for shippers, the blockage is anticipated to cause downstream backlogs as delayed ships surge into and overwhelm ports and losses in global trade of up to $10 billion. The United States is less reliant on the Suez Canal than European and Asian economies, but had the Panama Canal been similarly blocked, it could severely impact the U.S. economy, according to a 2010 U.S government study.

The Ever Given episode proves that ever-larger container ships transiting strategic chokepoints pose a challenge for modern tugs and salvage ships to quickly clear. It would take weeks for global supply chains to adjust to a prolonged disruption of the Panama or Suez Canals. Consider that, had this disruption occurred during the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic, medical supplies would have been delayed with high human costs.

To mitigate such disruptions, the Navy must ensure a distributed forward naval presence. On April 2 the Eisenhower CSG exited the Suez Canal heading south, leaving no naval strike group supporting operations in the Mediterranean.

Additionally, the Navy—in cooperation with the State Department—should seek to ensure that canal operators have adequate resources to clear the largest of vessels, grounded or intentionally sunk. This would be in Cairo’s financial interest as well as ours. The Suez Canal generates annual revenues of $5.6 billion, providing Egypt with critical foreign currency and making up almost two percent of its economy. Similarly, the Panama Canal generates $3.4 billion in annual revenues and accounts for 40 percent of that nation’s economy.

Nonetheless, the nation needs to look to procuring the capacity to unilaterally re-open strategic chokepoints should the need arise in a conflict. In the case of Ever Given, it required a special suction dredger able to remove two thousand cubic meters of soil an hour and special heavy capacity salvage tugs, like the Dutch ALP Guard which took five days to arrive.

Additionally, a third party with controlling stock of chokepoints, notably China in the Panama Canal, can imperil transit of critical war reserves or naval vessels in crisis. On this more action is needed.

With the Biden administration seeking a multi-trillion dollar “infrastructure” bill, it would be wise to consider investments that harden the U.S. economy to such disruptions. After all, in 2011, the U.S. relied on maritime shipping to receive 53 percent of its imports and send 38 percent of its exports and remains much the same today.

Ever Given’s grounding comes at a time when more and more political leaders and naval thinkers are turning to the precepts of America’s revered maritime visionary—Alfred Thayer Mahan—to answer the core question: “What is a Navy for?” The sight of hundreds of ships backed up around the Suez Canal as tensions rose from the Taiwan Straits to the Black Sea should be instructive.

#### Trade solves global crises

Ian Bremmer 19, PhD, Professor, Applied Geopolitics, Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, President, Eurasia Group, , editor-at-large at Time, 11/18/19, "The End of the American International Order: What Comes Next?", Time, https://time.com/5730849/end-american-order-what-next/

China has made its decision. Beijing is building a separate system of Chinese technology—its own standards, infrastructure, and supply chains—to compete with the West. Make no mistake: this is the single most consequential geopolitical decision taken in the last three decades. It’s also the greatest threat to globalization since the end of World War II. It wasn’t supposed to be like this. Globalization has lifted billions of people from poverty around the world. We now live longer, healthier, and more productive lives than ever before. We are better educated and better informed than at any time in history. There has never been a better place and a better time to be alive than right here, right now. So why are so many people so angry, and why is globalization under unprecedented threat? Why are citizens in country after country bitterly casting aside both governing and opposition parties in favor of political disruptors? At this moment in history, why is there so much alarm? Because this IS a moment of transformation, and uncertainty. In much of the world, the lightning-fast, cross-border flows of ideas, information, people, money, goods and services—the same forces that have created so much opportunity and prosperity—also generate fear. Fear that the world now becomes more complicated and more dangerous in real time. Fear that the world we knew is gone for good, and fear that no one is willing and able to do anything about it. I want to talk with you today about why all this is happening, and why it’s so vitally important that we’re having this conversation at this moment—and in the heart of this great country. Japan is both blessed and burdened by its unique place in this G-Zero world. Japan has the political stability, the foresight, and the technological talent to help lead the world into a brighter future than the one we currently face. We all have reason to hope that Japan’s leaders, its companies, its political will, and its people will help lead the transition toward a new order, one in which human ingenuity, moral imagination, and courage can help all of us meet the challenges to come. The Geopolitical Recession When I started Eurasia Group in 1998, our clients were interested almost exclusively in the so-called emerging-markets countries, those that presented both big growth opportunities and unfamiliar political challenges. I defined an emerging market as “any country where politics matters at least as much as economic fundamentals for market outcomes.” Countries like Japan, the United States, Canada, and the leading nations of Western Europe offered a much more stable and predictable political landscape, but more modest opportunities for growth. Those days are gone. The financial crisis of 2008 and the turmoil that followed have brought politics directly into the performance of economies and markets in even the world’s richest countries. We also face a growing number of transnational threats. The U.S.-led global order is finished. So many of the dark clouds now hanging over us—from climate change to cyber-conflict, from terrorism to the post-industrial revolution—move unchecked across borders, leaving national governments much less able to meet the needs of their citizens. Today, it is not economics but geopolitics that has become the main driver of global economic uncertainty. The world has entered a “geopolitical recession,” a bust cycle for the international system and relations among governments. It’s a time when alliances, institutions, and the values that bind them together are all coming apart. From an historical perspective, geopolitical recessions are both rarer than economic recessions and longer-lasting. We’ll be living in this geopolitical recession for at least a decade to come. How did we get here? Economists tell us that the process of “creative destruction” fuels the engine of growth that builds the future, and history says that’s true. But lives and livelihoods are destroyed in the process, and growing numbers of people say their government is either powerless to help them manage or doesn’t care what happens to them. Resentment of elites is on the rise in every region of the world. The system is rigged against them, they believe; it’s increasingly hard to argue they’re wrong. This creates opportunities for a new breed of populist who offers scapegoats and promises of protection. These politicians did not invent this problem. They’re just profiting from it. And the greatest worry is this: All this anger is building in good economic times. What happens when economies start to slow? History shows that governments that are unpopular at home are more likely to make trouble abroad, especially with their neighbors, to rally public support and divert attention from domestic troubles. That breeds less trust among governments. The risk of misunderstanding rises. Accidents are more likely—and more likely to escalate toward conflict. There are three implications to consider… The first centers on “tail risks,” the low-likelihood-but-high-impact events that have become commonplace in a world reshaped by China’s rise, Middle East turmoil, populist Europe, revanchist Russia, divided America, a world-record 71 million displaced people, and the destabilizing effects of technological and climate changes. Imagine a military accident in the South China Sea, at a time when the U.S. and Chinese presidents are locked in a war of wills over trade and technology, and determined to project strength at home, that spirals out of control. Turn to the Middle East—the U.S. has confronted Iran. Since President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal and then re-imposed sanctions, Iran has taken bold military action—including a strike on the heart of Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure. Washington responded by sending troops to Saudi Arabia, a move which, you might recall, sharply increased the risk of terrorism in the U.S. a generation ago. What if President Trump is defeated for re-election next year, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un discovers the next U.S. president won’t accept his phone calls? What provocative action might he take? What accidents might he risk? What if a debt crisis hits Italy, created when a future Italian government defies EU budget rules and inadvertently creates a financial crisis too large for lenders to manage? Or a miscalculation in Ukraine pulls Russia into a shooting war? Or a US-Russia cyber confrontation hits critical infrastructure, creating a humanitarian crisis inside an American city? The lack of coordinated leadership in today’s world, our G-zero world, makes all of these crises both more likely to happen and more difficult to manage when they do. Individually, they are long-shots. Collectively, they pose unprecedented danger. The second implication of the geopolitical recession is the breakdown of international institutions. The tens of millions of displaced people around the world today create one of the most urgent and expensive problems that the United Nations has to cope with. Yet, even as national governments are less willing to welcome big numbers of refugees, even fewer are willing to invest more to support the UN Refugee Agency. We also see fragmentation of European institutions as voters send growing numbers of anti-EU politicians to serve in the European parliament. There is no longer consensus among Europeans on the free movement of EU citizens across borders, on how to manage immigrants from outside the EU, or on important questions like how best to manage relations with Russia. The Trump administration has threatened the coherence of NATO, the most successful military alliance in history (French President Macron certainly seems to agree), and has withdrawn the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty with Russia, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Paris Climate Accord, to name only a few. The inevitable consequence of all this is a world that has become more unpredictable and much less safe. There is little chance in this environment to establish new agreements and new institutions to help manage tomorrow’s crises. Instead, individual governments will adopt their own rules in an attempt to contain challenges that don’t respect borders. They will threaten economic penalties and military retaliation in a world with fewer institutions able to enforce generally accepted rules and practices. The last implication of the geopolitical recession: The weakness of today’s international system not only leaves the world more vulnerable to crisis, but less resilient when crisis comes. In recent years, we’ve avoided a major international crisis. We’ve seen Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, the growth of populism across Europe, Russia’s bid to undermine Ukraine’s independence, Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power in China, a meltdown in Venezuela, and plenty of individual fires in the Middle East and in democracies across the world. But we have not yet experienced anything during this period that poses a challenge to the entire international system, and the global economy has remained relatively strong. Our luck can’t last.

#### Naval power solves nuclear war

Cropsey and McGrath, 18—Director AND Deputy Director, Center for American Seapower (Seth and Bryan, “Maritime Strategy in a New Era of Great Power Competition,” <https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/HudsonMaritimeStrategy.pdf>, dml)

As a maritime nation, naval power is the U.S.’s most useful means of responding to distant crises, preventing them from harming our security or that of our allies and partners, and keeping geographically remote threats from metastasizing into conflicts that could approach our borders. A maritime defense demands a maritime strategy. As national resources are increasingly strained the need exists for a strategy that makes deliberate choices to connect ends (security) with means (money and the fleet it builds). This paper examines the need for a maritime strategy, discusses options, and offers recommendations for policy makers.

After several decades of unchallenged world leadership, the United States once again faces great power competition, this time featuring two other world powers. China and Russia increasingly bristle under the constraints of the post-World War II systems of global trade, finance, and governance largely created by the United States and its allies, systems that the United States has protected and sustained to the economic and security benefit of its citizens and the citizens of other nations. Both China and Russia are demonstrably improving the quality of their armed forces while simultaneously acting aggressively toward neighboring countries, some of which are US treaty allies. Additionally, both nations are turning their attention to naval operations far from their own coasts, operations designed to advance national interests that are often in tension with those of the United States.1

For the past several decades, US national security strategy has not had to contend with great powers. Instead, it has concerned itself primarily with building alliances designed to manage regional security more efficiently by proxy, while devoting increasingly more resources to homeland defense and intelligence aimed at stemming acts of terror by Islamic radical organizations and their followers. To the extent that the US position of leadership in the world was not threatened, this strategy was reasonable, if imperfectly pursued. Such a strategy will no longer suffice in a world of great power competition, especially one in which powers of considerable—but unequal—strength are opposed. Unbalanced multi-polarity is an especially unstable condition, and the United States is not effectively postured to manage that instability. Henry Kissinger divides the concept of world order into two parts: a normative system that defines acceptable action, and a ‘balance of power’ arrangement that punishes the breach of such conventions2. As the underlying balance of forces shifts, states with different ideas of international order gain the power to reshape the system. Thucydides’ ancient insight holds true – the rise in power of one actor threatens all others. Where such threat exists and if the balance of power between states or coalitions approaches equilibrium, a “Cold War” between competing ideological camps occurs. In an unbalanced system, the stronger side is tempted to strike its weaker opponent while the balance of forces is favorable. Unbridled competition for supremacy defined Europe during its bloodiest periods. Europe’s 16th and 17th century religious wars between Catholics and Protestants and the global 20th century struggles between totalitarian ideologies and democracy both represent the natural end-state of unbalanced multipolar systems. Without norms to restrain states and force to uphold these norms, violence is very likely.

Today’s international system is moving toward unbalanced multi-polarity. Unfortunately, the United States is not currently prepared to manage such an international environment. If Americans want to preserve their nation’s secure and prosperous position as the world’s great power, the United States must begin now to prepare strategically for what it will inevitably face. Otherwise, it will ultimately be forced into an increasingly limited number of unattractive options to sustain its position of leadership.

There is little evidence that the people of the United States wish to see our position in the world diminished. The 2016 Presidential Election raised important questions about the degree to which globalization has served the interests of everyday Americans (and their perceptions thereof), while the two dominant US political parties have moved toward more protectionist policies, at least as articulated by their nominees. Opinion polling indicates the divided nature of the American public on issues like free trade and sustained foreign commitments.3 However, Americans remain cognizant of threats to the United States, and favor maintaining America’s position as a great power by sustaining a strong military.4 Moreover, it would be difficult to identify meaningful numbers of Americans who would sacrifice national security in favor of increased social spending, despite the continuing rise in non-discretionary spending in the federal budget. Americans understand that the US position of world leadership benefits the nation’s economy, its security, its allies, and the international order that has been the object of US foreign and defense policy for over a century. They know that their lives would be diminished if this position of global leadership were surrendered to an adversary or group of them. The paradox of the American experience is that the US is not simply a great power – it is an exceptional power, for which ideals count as much as strength. The American public, despite its aversion to foreign commitments, can rise to the occasion and respond to clear threats, as it has in both World Wars, the Cold War, and after September 11th. The job of the policymaker, therefore, is to ensure America remains a great power, so that when the occasion arises, it can act as an exceptional power.

It is critical then, for US political leaders to begin thinking more strategically about protecting and advancing America's position in the face of growing great power competition. This monograph asserts that a strategy to support such a goal would necessarily be maritime in nature, leveraging this nation’s great geographical advantages in the service of its national power. Sharing land borders with only two nations—both of whom are friendly to the United States—and separated from other great powers by vast oceans, the United States enjoys a security position quite unlike that of any other nation. For over a century, it has been the unspoken (but doggedly pursued) national security aim of the United States to ensure that no power rise to prominence in Asia or Europe so as to occupy a position there as dominant as the United States’ position in the Western Hemisphere. Were this to occur, not only could that nation then lock the United States out of the resources and activity of that region, but it could also then eventually turn its attention to challenging our position in the Western Hemisphere.5

Underlying this approach is the reality that most the world’s activity does not occur in our own hemisphere, but in Asia and Europe. American interests in these regions— political, diplomatic, economic, and military—are considerable and growing. Protecting and sustaining those interests must remain a priority of American policy, and maritime strategy is an effective tool in doing so.

Maritime strategy is a subset of grand strategy, and the relationship between the two is ably defined by Professor John B. Hattendorf of the Naval War College: “In its broadest sense, grand strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to achieve particular national goals. Within those terms, maritime strategy is the direction of all aspects of national power that relate to a nation’s interests at sea. The navy serves this purpose, but maritime strategy is not purely a naval preserve. Maritime strategy involves the other functions of state power that include diplomacy; the safety and defence of merchant trade at sea; fishing; the exploitation, conservation, regulation and defence of the exclusive economic zone at sea; coastal defence; security of national borders; the protection of offshore islands; as well as participation in regional and world-wide concerns relating to the use of oceans, the skies over the oceans and the land under the seas.6 It is wholly appropriate for the world’s dominant naval power—separated from its widely-flung interests by thousands of miles of open ocean—to develop and execute coherent maritime strategy. In a time of re-emerging great power competition, it is essential. The nation’s current maritime strategy7 is, unfortunately, not up to the task. It focuses insufficiently on great power competition; it does not recognize the rise in importance of conventional forces in deterring great power war; it does not provide a theory of conventional deterrence appropriate to great powers and their likely objectives; it does not suggest a posture for naval forces that acts as an effective deterrent; its derived force structure is too small and short on effective logistic support; it does not place sufficient value on naval partnerships with geographically important nations which may not be traditional partners; and it is silent on the need for the nation to invest in a maritime industrial base that can enable an appropriate strategy. This monograph urges new thinking about maritime strategy, a strategy compatible with the United States’ responsibilities as the leader of the free world, as well as the world’s premier political, military, economic, and diplomatic power. Such a strategy would seek to protect and sustain those leadership positions in the face of renewed great power competition, competition that largely subsumes other, lesser security concerns. There will be those who view this approach as a return to “Cold War” strategic thinking, and we do not shy from this comparison. The United States acted for decades as a coherent strategic actor when faced with expansionist Soviet totalitarianism, and it must act with equal coherence and resolve to contest China and Russia’s brands of aggressive mercantilism, regional expansion, and contempt for established global order. There will be those who evaluate our suggestions in this paper and conclude that the nation cannot afford it, that the expense associated with moving to a maritime grand strategy would imbalance the traditional “ends, ways, means” approach to the making of strategy. And while the ends, ways, means approach is generally relevant to military and operational strategy, it is unsuited to the making of grand strategy for one very important reason. Unlike subordinate levels of strategy, grand strategy re-allocates, realigns, and re-orients a nation’s “means” to serve strategic “ends”. Military strategy starts with the proposition that there is a certain resource level available to pursue its ends. Grand strategy starts with the sum of the nation’s output capacity, and then determines how it can most effectively be allocated to the achievement of strategic goals.

Short of war itself, there is nothing in American history that causes strategic realignment more reliably than a change in Administration, and we wish to be part of that dialogue. We argue here for a new theory of deterrence, one that revises the Cold War approach in which the Soviet Union was deterred from large-scale conventional attack by the threat of nuclear escalation. Under that rubric, one could justifiably say that America’s conventional deterrent was dependent on its strategic deterrent. Today, the decapitating “bolt from the blue” strike is even more remote than it was in the Cold War, and to the extent that nuclear exchange between great powers is conceivable, it is far more likely to flow from conventional conflict that has gone awry. Therefore, to deter nuclear war, we must deter conventional war. No aspect of American military power will be more critical to deterring either nuclear or conventional super-power war than seapower.

### 2ac – egypt-israel sceanrio

#### Aid’s resilient – regardless of HR violations – cuts are symbolic – it’s untouchable compensation for maintaining peace between Egypt AND Israel

Farah Najjar 17, Farah Najjar is an online news and features writer with Al Jazeera English. She covers war and conflict, politics and development in the Middle East region. She has reported from Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and the Gaza Strip amongst others, 10-3-2017, "Why US aid to Egypt is never under threat," Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/3/why-us-aid-to-egypt-is-never-under-threat>, nihara

Egyptian businessmen ordered more than 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades from US rival North Korea in a secret deal last year, the Washington Post reported on Sunday. The United Nations described it as the “largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.

The UN revealed that the business executives sought to buy weapons for the Egyptian military. The report prompted US criticism, while the Egyptian embassy in Washington pointed to Egypt’s willingness to cooperate with UN officials in “finding and destroying the contraband”.

The Post reported that the North Korea incident was among a number of factors that led US President Donald Trump’s administration to freeze nearly $300m in military aid to Egypt in August.

Egypt also remains unaccountable for human rights violations.

Over the past several years, there have been many concerns over human rights abuses, including suppressing freedom of speech and the implementation of laws that limit the operations of civil society groups.

Does Egypt’s human rights record really matter?

The US has not taken any substantial punitive measures against Egypt, even as organisations such as Human Rights Watch describe Egypt’s current human rights crisis as the worst “in the country’s modern history”.

Egypt will likely continue to receive assistance regardless of legal provisions it might be violating, said James Gelvin, a professor of Middle East history at the University of California, noting that human rights-based restrictions are almost “routinely ignored when committed by a government the US wishes to support”.

Along with Israel and Afghanistan, Egypt is one of the three biggest recipients of US funding and weapons.

How much aid does the US provide to Egypt?

Since 1979, Egypt has been receiving uninterrupted aid at an average of $1.6bn a year, the bulk of which goes to the military.

Military support has come in the form of arms distribution and military training services. A biennial series of joint military exercises led by Egyptian and US troops in Egypt commenced in 1980.

Referred to as Operation Bright Star, the coalition training is designed to strengthen ties between the two country’s forces and to assist the United States in solidifying its strategic alliances in the Middle East.

In August, the US cut tens of millions in aid from Egypt, citing the country’s failure to make progress on human rights and democratic norms – but experts described these cuts as largely symbolic.

Why does Egypt get US aid?

For a country to become an eligible recipient of US aid, it must align itself with American interests and foreign policy, analysts say.

In the case of Egypt, US aid granted since the signing of the 1978 Camp David Accords was “untouchable compensation” for maintaining peace with Israel. This deal is considered a cornerstone of US-Egyptian relations.

Robert Springborg, a Middle East expert and non-resident fellow at the Italian Institute of International Affairs, told Al Jazeera that US economic support was intended to stabilise Anwar Sadat’s [former Egyptian president] government and succeeding ones.

How does the US benefit?

The primary benefit is the “cessation of hostilities against Israel” by Egypt and “other Arab states that could not wage war against Israel in the absence of Egyptian participation”, Springborg said.

In addition to Egyptian support for American “counterterrorism and counterinsurgency” campaigns, Springborg says the US also enjoys marginal benefits, including access to Egyptian airspace and the prioritisation of US naval vessels through the Suez Canal.

The high amount of military aid, in particular, has also helped to create jobs and to reduce unemployment in the US. More than 1.3 million Americans work in manufacturing weaponry for defence companies, and more than three million others support the industry indirectly.

The US is among the world’s top five arms producers and distributors, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

“The United States does not give money to Egypt for military equipment; it gives the Egyptian military a list of equipment the American government will purchase on its behalf in the United States,” Gelvin told Al Jazeera.

What about economic aid?

Economic assistance, or American “investments” in Egypt, are a relatively small part of the package, analysts say.

Economic aid now stands at less than $200m annually, compared with more than $1bn from the early 1980s through the early 2000s, Springborg said.

Egypt’s domestic stability is important to the US, and so there is a sustained interest in its local economy. If the Egyptian economy collapses, it will render the region unstable, Gelvin said. And since the Egyptian military controls up to 60 percent of the Egyptian economy, it is unlikely that it will relinquish economic control to other institutions or factions in Egypt.

According to Gelvin, this was part of the Camp David package: “Since the army was not going to fight its main enemy of 30 years, it had to have some reason for being, and being so large.”

Aid stream for Egypt continuing despite violations

There are both political and legal conditions that must be met by countries on the US foreign aid list.

In 2012, US Congress made aid to Egypt conditional on the secretary of state certifying that the country was supporting human rights and democratic values. This came in response to an Egyptian crackdown on American NGO workers.

The amendment also required the secretary of state to ensure that Egypt was upholding its commitments to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty.

Yet these provisions have not affected the aid stream to Egypt, a country infamous for its human rights abuses.

In 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waived the certification requirements after the Obama administration claimed that there was no way of ensuring such provisions were met.

In 2013, a military takeover that led to the removal of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, struck “concern” among top White House officials, but they fell short of calling it a coup, which would have prohibited them from providing Egypt with military equipment.

#### The CP would decisively cut aid to Egypt – OR, it doesn’t solve the net benefit

Ibrahim Ali 20, Fall 2020, “Note: Beyond Credible Fear: Enforcement of the Leahy Law and the Role the Asylum System Should Play,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 35, 235, pp. 241-244, Lexis, nihara

A. Egypt

Despite its human rights record, Egypt is one of the biggest recipients of U.S. aid. A lower middle-income country, Egypt received $ 1.25 billion in U.S. foreign assistance in FY2018. 40Of that amount, $ 1 billion went towards foreign military financing. 41Over the last 70 years, it has received over $ 80 billion in U.S. foreign assistance, 42and it has requested $ 1.38 billion for FY 2020. 43While it remains a key foreign aid recipient, Egypt's human rights record is disturbing. 44

The Egyptian state has tortured suspects, implemented mass trials against children, and executed detainees. In January 2002, Mr. Ahmad El-Maati, a falsely accused terrorist suspect, was tortured by Egyptian security officials:

[a]n electric prod was used on [El-Maati's] hands, legs and genitals during interrogations. His hands were cuffed so tightly that his wrists bled. . . . He was kept blindfolded and handcuffed in a hallway with other prisoners for what he estimates was about two weeks. It was during this time, Mr. El-Maati says, that he developed anal bleeding. Canadian doctors later diagnosed an anal fissure requiring surgery. 45

Since 2013, the Egyptian government's use of mass trials and death sentences against children have skyrocketed; these include death sentences issued by military courts 46-- the same military that has received billions of dollars in assistance from the U.S. government. 47The U.S.-based human rights organization, Belady, puts the number of children arrested by the current regime for political reasons at over 2,000. 48Since former General el-Sisi assumed office, Egypt has been among the ten countries with the highest numbers of executions per year. 49At an Arab-EU summit in 2019, el-Sisi stood by his government's actions, arguing that executing detainees is part of "our humanity," distinguishing it from "your [European] humanity." 50Yet, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution states that Islam is the official state religion and that the primary source of legislation is Sharia law. 51The Quran forbids unjust killing, including judicially mandated death sentences that lack due process. 52El-Sisi's use of "our humanity" as justification for mass trials, death sentences in absentia, and sham military trials should sound the alarms for a White House that claims to be sending aid to "those who respect us." 53

In April 2019, the Egyptian Constitution was amended to lengthen el-Sisi's term from four to six years and to allow him to run for an additional term, solidifying his ability to remain in power until 2030; it also gave him far greater control over the judicial branch. 54The fairness of the referendum on these amendments was widely criticized. Websites that encouraged people to vote "no" were blocked by the government, and Egyptian citizens living abroad were given very little notice to travel to a consulate to vote. 55

Between 2017 and 2019, the Egyptian government blocked over 600 news, political, and human rights websites without judicial authorization. 56It was also among the four worst countries for journalists in 2018, with twenty-five journalists arrested that year, nineteen of which detained for "spreading false news." 57In August 2020, Egypt's "special counterterrorism courts" sentenced in absentia Bahey eldin Hassan, a prominent human rights activist, to fifteen years in prison for criticizing President Sissi's regime on Twitter. 58

In May 2015, the State Department informed Congress that it was in the national interest to continue assisting Egypt, but it also highlighted many of the country's violations that year, writing: "Government forces have committed arbitrary or otherwise unlawful killings during dispersal of demonstrators, of persons in custody, and during military operations in the northern Sinai Peninsula." 59This was not an isolated incident. Public Law 115-141 states that of the $ 1.3 billion in assistance to Egypt, $ 300 million must be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking effective steps on various human rights. 60However, it also states that the Secretary may waive the certification requirement if he or she determines that doing so is important to the national security interest of the U.S. 61In August 2019, a year full of gross violations of human rights by the Egyptian government, Secretary Pompeo invoked the national security interest waiver. 62Judging by the broad power vested in the Secretary of State by the statute, it is fairly straightforward for the Secretary to override the recommendations of DRL officials and investigators on the ground at U.S. embassies abroad; he or she merely has to declare that it is in the national security interest of the U.S. to do so. 63

Despite Egypt's troubling track record (these are only a few examples), the Trump administration has been outspoken in its support of the Egyptian dictatorship. 64On April 3, 2017, President Trump welcomed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the White House. 65During an interview in the Oval Office, President Trump spoke highly of his Egyptian counterpart: "We are very much behind President el-Sisi. He's done a fantastic job . . . And I just want to say to you, Mr. President, that you have a great friend and ally in the United States and in me." 66Just eighteen days later, on April 21, 2017, President Trump welcomed to the White House Ms. Aya Hijazi, an Egyptian-American humanitarian worker who was incarcerated by el-Sisi's regime for three years without a trial. 67During the televised meeting, no mention was made of the Egyptian government's treatment of Ms. Hijazi, and the President refused to take any questions. 68Ironically, while in the Oval Office, she sat in the same chair that was occupied by her authoritarian persecutor eighteen days earlier. 69Furthermore, at the G7 Summit in France in September 2019, President Trump notoriously called out, "Where's my favorite dictator?" while awaiting a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart. 70"Egypt has a great leader, he's highly respected, he's brought order," President Trump said at a meeting with el-Sisi during the UN General Assembly in September 2019. 71That same week, el-Sisi's regime arrested more than 2,000 peaceful protesters throughout the country. 72

#### Egypt-Israel conflict goes nuclear

Robert Farley 19, Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College. 1-15-2019, "Israel’s Nuclear Weapons: The Worst-Kept Military Secret on the Planet," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israel%E2%80%99s-nuclear-weapons-worst-kept-military-secret-planet-41672>, nihara

Conventional Defeat

The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor.

How might that happen? We can imagine a few scenarios, most of which involve an increase in hostility between Israel and its more tolerant neighbors. Another revolution in Egypt could easily rewrite the security equation on Israel’s southern border; while the friendship of Saudi Arabia seems secure, political instability could change that; even Turkish policy might shift in a negative direction. Israel currently has overwhelming conventional military advantages, but these advantages depend to some extent on a favorable regional strategic environment. Political shifts could leave Israel diplomatically isolated, and vulnerable once again to conventional attack. In such a situation, nuclear weapons would remain part of the toolkit for ensuring the survival of the nation.

### ---1ar – uq

#### US-Egypt cooperation now AND increasing

Ahmed Ali 7/6, 7-06-2022, "Egyptian, US forces carry out joint training exercise," Arab News, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2117781/middle-east>, nihara

CAIRO: The air forces of the US and Egypt have carried out a joint training exercise at a base in the North African country, strengthening military cooperation between the two countries.

An Egyptian military spokesman announced that the exercise involved a series of lectures on unifying combat concepts and exchanging training experiences, and saw a number of multitask combat aircraft deployed by the US Air Force and Egyptian Air Force for training flights on operational missions and mid-air refueling in the air both during the day and at night.

The training flights demonstrated the extent to which the Egyptian Air Force has reached a high level of professionalism that qualifies its fighter pilots to carry out all tasks entrusted to them.

The exercise comes in light of the growing partnership and military cooperation between Cairo and Washington.

### ---1ar – link

#### Aid to Egypt is on the brink – BUT, Biden’s continuing it, despite HR concerns – the CP entrenches suspension – it’s the lynchpin of credibility for the net benefit

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The Biden administration recently authorized $2.5 billion in arms sales to Egypt. The weapons were military planes and air defense radar systems. This follows a $170 million military aid authorization in September. It also precedes the suspension of $130 million of military aid. This suspension occurred because Cairo did not meet standards about basic human rights conditions.

Egypt has been the second highest recipient of U.S. military aid worldwide. They receive $1.3 billion per year, most of which is foreign military financing. This aid is earmarked to buy U.S. weapons, equipment, and training. The Biden administration notes that this aid is going to a country that violates U.S. Leahy Law practices. These are the rules that intend to prevent human rights abuses from U.S. security aid. This acknowledgement happened both in 2020 and when it canceled the most recent suspended aid delivery.

Thus, the $2.5 billion sale is an example of a risky sale that the administration should avoid. According to the recently released 2021 Arms Sales Risk Index, Egypt ranks as the eighteenth most risky recipient of arms sales. The government is corrupt, undemocratic, commits human rights abuses, and inspires terrorism. Sending Egypt billions of dollars of U.S. weapons may seem like aiding an ally. Instead, this means that the U.S. needs to choose better allies.

Before, U.S. weapons have financed the Egyptian military. Between 2009 and 2020, the U.S. has sent Egypt $3.2 billion in fighter aircrafts, $2.3 billion in rotary aircrafts, $1.58 billion in support, $1.3 billion in tanks and armored vehicles, $240 million in naval craft, and over $1.4 billion in missiles, munitions, and radar.

The history and current administration’s policy on arms sales to Egypt make little sense. These weapons are not going to causes like improving human rights. From a data perspective, its score in the human rights components of the Cato Institute’s Arms Sales Risk Index have worsened every year.

Beyond the data, over the last five years, Egypt has waged a proxy conflict against Turkey in Libya, is home to around 1,000 ISIS militants, has forced human rights groups to shut down, uses advanced technology to track and target citizens, institutes a prison system that has led to increasing recruits for ISIS and al-​Qaeda, and used a draconian counterterrorism campaign to murder 755 people – many of whom are simple political opposition, not terrorists. The military-​led government and military itself commit these crimes.

Overall, U.S. weapons in Egypt fund a government whose draconian policies lead to arguments with other Middle Eastern countries and inspire and enable terrorist groups. These weapons help the Egyptian government commit some of the worst human rights abuses occurring in the world.

By definition, transferring weapons to human rights abusers does not help fight human rights abuse. Yet, the Biden administration continues to tout a foreign policy supposedly based on human rights.

The administration cannot have it both ways. It can choose to either support or fight global human rights abuses. Weapons sales to Egypt clearly support human rights abuses, which undermines the stated goals of Biden’s foreign policy.

### ---1ar – turns the nb

#### Aid to Egypt turns the net benefit – it’s key to human rights outcomes – health programs, declined mortality, clean water, sanitation, education, electricity, economic development – AND, democratic transition

Wilson Center 12, 9-10-2012, "U.S. Assistance to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya," <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-assistance-to-egypt-tunisia-and-libya>, nihara

The United States has maintained its $1.3 billion military aid package, based on the 1978 Camp David Accords. The Obama administration has also tried to promote private investment by U.S. multinational corporations. More than 100 American executives from dozens of top U.S. companies visited Egypt in September 2012. But Washington has also tried to come up with new resources through international institutions and agreements, such as the Deauville Partnership.

The U.S. Government will support Egypt and the Egyptian people with their needs for economic recovery, free and fair elections, and overall stability. In the short-term, our assistance efforts will leverage existing funding to produce quick, concrete results and have a tangible impact in support of Egypt’s economic recovery and democratic transition. We recognize that a prosperous and democratic Egypt, buoyed by economic growth and a strong private sector, can be an anchor of stability for the Middle East and North Africa.

Long-term Partnership with the Egyptian People: Working together over the years, we are particularly gratified that we have been able to help Egyptians in practical ways. We are proud of over thirty years of U.S. assistance to Egypt, in which the United States has:

Contributed massive resources to one of the most successful and renowned health programs worldwide, resulting in a 15-year extension of the lifespan of Egyptians, a decrease in the maternal mortality rate by over 50% and the child mortality rate by over 70%, and the eradication of polio;

Provided clean drinking water and sanitation to the city of Cairo and other metropolitan areas where no such service was previously available (the sewer system we constructed in Cairo constitutes the largest construction project in the world);

Built more than 2,000 schools and stocked 39,000 school libraries, and helped Egypt double literacy levels;

Sent thousands of Egyptians to the United States for advanced university studies;

Invested $1.8 billion in power sector projects accounting for roughly one-third of total present capacity; and

Invested billions in technical and financial assistance to modernize Egypt’s economy to create new jobs in fields like high-technology and manufacturing. This has directly contributed to Egypt’s status as a top ten country in the World Bank Doing Business report four out of the last five years.

### ---1ar – xt: suez i/l

#### Geopolitical access is key to access the Suez Canal – BOTH for trade AND military assets – that’s why NO administration has cut ties

Ibrahim Ali 20, Fall 2020, “Note: Beyond Credible Fear: Enforcement of the Leahy Law and the Role the Asylum System Should Play,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 35, 235, pp. 252-253, Lexis, nihara

A. Geopolitical Considerations with Respect to Egypt

A key consideration that makes Egypt a crucial player in world politics is geography. Stretching 120 miles, the Suez Canal is an essential link between Europe and Asia. 135It connects the Mediterranean and the Red Seas, separating Africa from Asia, making it one of the most frequented shipping lanes in the world. 136For decades, Egypt has been crucial for moving American military assets through the region, as it gives the U.S. preferential passage through the canal. 137Geography also empowers Egypt with respect to its proximity to Israel. 138The eastern border of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula borders Israel. One city in particular, Rafah, borders the Gaza Strip, making it the only operational border crossing between Egypt and the Palestinian territories. 139Because of the longstanding relationship between the U.S., Egypt, and Israel, the three countries have historically come to agreement on how "operational" that border crossing is. 140For example, the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA): Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing allows EU monitors to be present and Israeli officials to oversee the crossing via video surveillance. 141Moreover, Egypt and Israel cooperate in fighting terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula, which benefits U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East. 142Finally, Egypt's deployment of troops to Kuwait during the First Gulf War served as a "pan-Arab blessing for the [U.S.-led] operation," which did not go unnoticed by the Bush administration (41), marking one of the high points of the two countries' relationship. 143These considerations would certainly make it challenging for any U.S. administration to turn its back on Egypt.

### 2ac – at: hr nb

#### CP decks foreign policy – cooperation with authoritarian countries is inevitable – ONLY flips the net benefit and makes the counterplan’s threat uncredible – NO modelling – BUT, it’s key to oil, reducing gas prices, AND cooperation with China

Fred Kaplan 6/15, 6-15-2022, "The Misguided Foreign Policy Promise That’s Now Making Joe Biden Look Like a Hypocrite," Slate Magazine, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/07/joe-bidens-saudi-trip-highlights-one-of-his-administrations-big-foreign-policy-blunders.html>, nihara

Americans are not enthusiastic about President Biden’s upcoming trip to the Middle East, his first since winning the White House. In a recent poll, just a quarter of those surveyed liked the idea of the visit; a third disliked it. (Presumably the other 40 percent or so don’t care one way or the other.) The main reason for the high negatives: His stop-off in Saudi Arabia.

During the 2020 election, Biden promised to regard Saudi as a “pariah” nation in stark contrast to President Trump, who treated the royal family as beloved relatives and waved away its assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, an American resident, as an irrelevancy in the face of lucrative arms purchases. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in his first major speech, one month into Biden’s term, pledged that the administration’s foreign policy would be “centered on the defense of democracy and the protection of human rights.”

Yet Biden flies off to Riyadh this month, and, whatever nobler reasons have been conjured for the visit, the real one is to ask the Royals to open their oil spigots, in order to reduce gas prices (and thus reduce inflation) while allowing the West to maintain its ban on crude from Russia.

The situation is reminiscent of Biden’s relationship with China. Early in his term, the president said he would hold Beijing “accountable” for its gross human-rights violations. Yet last week, in a five-hour meeting, Blinken urged China’s foreign minister to join America’s side in defending Ukraine from Russia’s aggression.

The point here is not to play gotcha games. Nor is it to argue that the U.S. foreign policy should be based on lofty ideals or hard-headed interests but not both. However, Biden and Blinken erred in declaring that their foreign policy would be “centered” on democracy and human rights—a choice that was bound to make life more difficult as they inevitably sought cooperation with authoritarian regimes.

There are four reasons why indulging in that rhetoric was a mistake.

First, they must have known that, at some point, they would have to saddle up with disreputable leaders—if just to choose the lesser of two evils—and that, by doing so, they would be accused of hypocrisy.

There are often very good reasons for allying with bad people. During World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill formed a powerful alliance with Josef Stalin in order to beat Adolf Hitler; if they hadn’t, on the grounds that Stalin was also evil, then Nazi Germany would have conquered all of Europe.

In less extreme circumstances, world leaders have often contained rivals while cooperating with them where their interests converge. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in an arms race and proxy wars while also negotiating arms-control treaties, keeping nuclear weapons out of other countries’ hands, and jointly developing a smallpox vaccine, among other good deeds. Questions of democracy and anti-democracy had nothing to do with any of it.

Second, highlighting our differences with authoritarian countries, much less underlining those differences as the core of our foreign policy, may have made cooperation—when it’s possible and where it matters—harder to achieve. Would China’s Xi Jinping be more amenable to ditching Russia and helping Ukraine if he didn’t think that sticking by Vladimir Putin would hurt the U.S.? And would he be less keen on hurting the U.S. if Biden hadn’t declared the very nature of China’s government to be a threat? I don’t know the answers—but these seem like a reasonable questions.

Meanwhile, by denouncing Saudi Arabia as “pariah” state (however justifiably), has Biden made it harder for the royal family to supply more oil? Has he given the Saudis more leverage in demanding returns for the favor?

The third problem with declaring that human rights will be the centerpiece of your foreign policy is that, once we side with an authoritarian who violates them on some issue, our criticisms of some other violator won’t be taken seriously. And after that, much of what we say about foreign policy will be regarded with suspicion, if not cynicism. Biden has said he plans to talk sternly to his Saudi hosts about human rights. He will no doubt be sincere, but it’s unlikely that his hosts will take a word of it seriously.

Finally, centering our foreign policy—staking our global standing—on the triumph of democracy and human rights may not be a winning strategy these days. According to Freedom House, just 20 percent of the world’s population is living in a “free country.” Can we form an effective alliance against the other 80 percent?

Besides, the U.S. isn’t quite the beacon of democracy that it once was. Several times since entering office, Biden has declared that, in its competition with authoritarianism (especially China), the U.S. has to show that democratic governments can “do big things.” Yet Congress is so deadlocked, the Supreme Court is so at odds with public opinion, and politics and society are so out of alignment on so many issues that we’re on the verge of showing that we can’t do much after all. To the extent that democracy is still valued in the world, the United States is no longer widely seen as a model to emulate.

This is key. In 1994, on his 90th birthday, George Kennan, the architect of America’s Cold War containment policy, said in a speech looking back on his life and career, “It is primarily by example, never by precept, that a country such as ours exerts its most useful influence beyond its borders.” As if on cue, late last year, after Biden assembled a fairly useless Summit for Democracy, the editors of Politico asked 18 activists in endangered democracies, from Iraq to Poland to India, what Biden should do to help democracy in their countries. The majority replied, essentially: Don’t lecture us; clean up your own problems; become a role model again.

So, should Biden be traveling to Saudi Arabia? Trump made a huge mistake in dismissing Khashoggi’s murder as a trifle—not just as a moral matter but for reasons that any viewer of The Godfather would understand: No prince in a foreign family can be allowed to get away with killing one of our own. Trump should have turned on the pressure, cut off oil imports (when we were in a position to do so), stepped up intel ops against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (who, according to a U.S. intelligence report, personally approved the murder)—everything possible to make sure that everyone saw this as unacceptable.

Alas, it’s a bit late for that now. MBS is more deeply ensconced in Riyadh’s power structure, our leverage on energy supplies is diminished, and so is our leverage in the new Middle Eastern politics, where the Sunni nations—Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait—have formed a coalition with Israel, for the common containment of Iran, quite apart from any involvement, much less leadership, from Washington.

None of this should be read as a defense of ultra-Realpolitik thinking. Our interests mean little without the underlying strength of our values. Our foreign policy should focus, whenever possible, on making the world safer for democracy. It should stand with democratic countries in every forum and conflict. It should speak out on behalf of democratic causes around the world. However, it is impractical—in some instances, it has been and would be counterproductive—to place democratic values at the center of foreign policy, to make a country’s democratic practices the measure of whether we should side with that country on any issue.

Sometimes we don’t have the power to insist that a country follow our example. And sometimes, these days, our example doesn’t have the power to inspire anyone to follow us. That’s what we truly need to focus on.

### 2ac – at: dpt

#### Democratic peace is statistically disproven---it’s conflict driving

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The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states—is one of the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace, disagreement remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically (e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001).

At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, andWolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore 1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevehouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch 2002b), and natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. Each of these putative causes of democracy is also associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly they are not.

We seek to contribute to this literature, not by proposing yet another theory to explain how democracy vanquishes war, but by estimating the causal effect of joint democracy on the probability of militarized disputes using a quasi-experimental research design. We begin by noting that some of the common causes of democracy and peace may be unobservable, generating an endogenous relationship between the two. Theories of democracy and explanations for peace are at a formative state; it is not possible to utilize detailed, validated and widely accepted models of each of these processes to assess their interaction. Indeed, to a remarkable degree democracy and peace each remain poorly understood and weakly accounted for empirically, despite their central roles in international politics. We address the risk of spurious correlation by applying an instrumental variables approach. Having taken into account possible endogeneity between democracy and peace, we find that joint democracy does not have an independent pacifying effect on interstate conflict. Instead, our findings show that democratic countries are more likely to attack other democracies than are non-democracies. Our results call into question the large body of theory that has been proposed to account for the apparent pacifism of democratic dyads.

### 2ac – democracy bad – nigeria

#### Democracy causes Nigerian state collapse and civil war

Dr. Moses E. Ochonu 19, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in History and Professor of African History at Vanderbilt University, PhD and MA in African History from the University of Michigan, BA in History from Bayero University, Graduate Certificate in Conflict Management from Liscomb University, “Why Liberal Democracy is a Threat to Nigeria’s Stability”, Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, May 2019, http://logosjournal.com/2019/liberal-democracy-is-a-threat-to-nigerias-stability/

In 2015, Nigeria, a country of about 190 million, spent $625 million to conduct federal and local elections. By comparison, India, with a population of 1.2 billion, spent $600 million on its 2015 election, according to figures released by the Electoral Commission of India (ECI).[1]

In 2019, the election budget of Nigeria’s Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) rose to $670 million. This represents about 2.5 percent of Nigeria’s $28.8 billion budget for 2019, a portion of which is being financed through borrowing. To put the electoral spending in context, more than half of the country subsists on about a dollar a day, and the country recently acquired the dubious distinction of being named the poverty capital of the world, with more people living in extreme poverty there than in any other country.[2] Key infrastructures and services such as roads, railway, electricity, water supply, healthcare, and education are severely inadequate, requiring urgent investments and interventions.

Election-related expenditure is expected to rise in the near future as INEC implements a wider slate of digital technologies to combat manipulation and improve the integrity of the electoral process. For comparison, Nigeria typically devotes about 7 percent of its budget to education. And yet Nigeria continues to maintain a four-year election cycle, with smaller by-elections occurring in between. This electoral calendar guarantees that about $1 billion is spent on elections every four years. As the electoral price tag has grown, democratic dividends have plummeted.

Nigeria’s predicament is a microcosm of the phenomenon of rising financial costs of elections in Africa and diminishing returns on democracy. Across the continent, the cost of electoral democracy is increasing and threatens the delivery of social goods. As African countries battle myriad socioeconomic challenges, the question needs to posed: is it wise for these countries to continue to spend a large percentage of their revenue every four or five years on a political ritual with fewer and fewer positive socioeconomic consequences for their populations? Is this expensive, periodic democratic ritual called election worth its price?

It is not only the monetary cost of elections that now threatens to defeat their purpose and engender disillusionment and, along with disillusionment, the erosion of trust in the state and its ability to produce and distribute public goods. The social cost of periodic elections has been arguably greater, depleting, with each election cycle, the residual stability of the state and the credibility of its institutions.

Elections conducted in Nigeria since the return of civilian rule in 1999 have brought with them anxiety, tension, death, violence, and dangerous rhetoric that, taken together, have frayed the national political and social fabric. Elections have widened fissures and intensified preexisting primordial cleavages.

I can recall no electoral cycle since at least 2003 that was not been accompanied by fears of Nigeria’s disintegration or at the very least the acceleration of its demise. In 2007 and 2011, post-election violence claimed hundreds of lives in Northern Nigeria as supporters of then candidate Muhammadu Buhari rioted after his loss. In the 2019 presidential and national assembly elections, at least 46 people were reported to have died from election-related violence. In the state assembly and governorship elections two weeks later on March 9, 2019, another 10 people died across five states in what the Sunday Tribune newspaper described in its headline as “another bloody election.”[3]

Two riders below the same Sunday Tribune headline encapsulate the turbulent character of Nigerian elections. One was “Thugs, vote buyers, arsonists take over on election day”; the other was “Nigerians condemn militarization of elections in Rivers, Bayelsa, Kwara, Akwa Ibom, Benue,” a reference to the government’s deployment of soldiers and other military assets to opposition strongholds before and during the election. The involvement of soldiers and other military personnel in the election was a brazen violation of Nigeria’s Electoral Act, an action which many observers interpreted as the incumbent administration’s effort to use its might to manipulate the election in states held by the opposition.

Every election cycle in Nigeria sees massive, fear-induced demographic mobility as members of different ethnic groups and religions relocate to areas considered dominated by their kinsmen and co-religionists to await the conclusion of elections that often degenerate into communal clashes especially in the volatile north of the country.

Periodic national elections have thus worsened Nigeria’s notoriously frail union and caused apathy and discontent. The Nigerian people, the major stakeholders in Nigeria’s democracy, have grown weary of being periodically endangered and rendered pawns in an elaborate elite ritual with little or no consequence for their lives.

Electoral aftermaths have not improved economic conditions or strengthened the capacity of citizens to hold elected leaders accountable. Moreover, as I shall discuss shortly, the familiar abstract freedoms that democracy, lubricated by periodic elections, can confer on citizens who participate in such exercises, have eluded Nigerians.

The result has been noticeable apathy represented most poignantly by voter turnout, which declined from a peak of 69.1 percent in 2003 to 46.3 percent in 2015 and to about 35 percent in 2019. In the same 2019 election cycle, turnout declined to less than 20 percent in the governorship and state assembly elections, with many Nigerians on social media stating that they had lost faith in the electoral process and that the official results of the presidential elections two weeks earlier had shown that their votes would not count towards the declared outcome.

Voter apathy alone is not an indication of democratic disillusionment but it can portend or indicate something more devastating: diminishing trust in the state, its institutions, and its processes.

Such a trust deficit exists already and it predated the return of civilian rule in 1999 after about two decades of military dictatorship. However, by all theoretical formulations, such a cumulative loss of confidence in the transactional sociopolitical contract between the state and citizens should be corrected by the democratic ideals of voting, representation, and accountability. This has not happened in Nigeria. In fact, the opposite scenario is visible: a negative correlation between successive electoral cycles and citizens’ trust in the Nigerian state. Therein lay the paradoxical consequences of democratic practice in Nigeria.

If elections are increasingly burdensome as they have become in Nigeria, the corrective potential of democracy, broadly speaking, is lost. Citizens consequently lose faith in the state and resort to self-help, including criminal self-help. That is how states collapse. Nigeria is not far off this possibility.

In Nigeria, recent political realities reveal a blind spot of pro-democracy advocacy: without the modulating effect of decentralization, sustained economic growth, a growing, secure middle class, and a literate, hopeful poor, liberal democracy can do and has done more damage than good. Liberal democracy has ironically become both an incubator and protector of mediocrity, corruption, and bad governance. The overarching casualty has been Nigeria’s very stability.

#### Nigerian instability escalates to global great power war

Charles A. Ray 21, Member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, “Does Africa Matter to the United States?”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1/11/2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/does-africa-matter-to-the-united-states/

Africa matters in terms of size, population, and rate of population growth. It is the continent currently most affected by climate change but is also a continent that can have a devastating impact on climate change globally because of the importance of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is the second-largest absorber of heat after the Amazon rainforest. The destruction of this important ecosystem could further accelerate global warming. As residents of the region come into increasing contact with the animals of the rainforest, this region could be the origin of the world’s next viral pandemic. Violent extremism and terrorism are increasing in Africa, and while now mostly localized, the danger has the potential to spread beyond the continent. Crises—natural and man-made—cause massive relocations of populations, both on the continent and abroad, which can have negative economic, social, and political impacts.

Why Africa Matters

The African continent is the world’s second-largest, with the second-fastest growth rate after Asia. With 54 sovereign countries, four territories, and two de facto independent states with little international recognition, the continent has a current population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, the continent’s population is predicted to rise to 2.4 billion. By 2100, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, will have a population of one billion, and half the world’s population growth will be in Africa by then.

The population of African countries is also overwhelmingly young. Approximately 40% of Africans are under 15, and, in some countries, over 50% is under 25. By 2050, two of every five children born in the world will be in Africa, and the continent’s population is expected to triple. These developments have positive and negative potential impacts on the United States and the rest of the world. Young Africans have, for the most part, completely skipped the analog age and gone directly digital. Comfortable with technology, they form a huge potential consumer and labor market. If, on the other hand, the countries of Africa fail to develop economically and do not create gainful employment for this young population, then there is the risk that they will become a huge potential source of recruits to extremist and terrorist movements, which currently target disadvantaged and disenchanted youth.

Lack of economic opportunity, increased urbanization, and climate-fueled disasters will also contribute to movement of people seeking better lives, which will impact economies and security not only on the continent of Africa, but also the economic and security situations around the world. Nations, lacking adequate critical infrastructure, education, and job opportunities are ripe for internal unrest and radicalization. In particular, inadequate health delivery systems, when coupled with natural disasters, such as droughts or floods that limit food production, cause famine and mass movements of populations.

The Challenges for U.S. Policy

Prior to World War II, the U.S. policy towards Africa was not as active as it was toward Europe, Asia, or Latin America. During the Cold War, Africa policy was primarily viewed from a perspective of super-power competition. The end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism introduced this as a major component in U.S. Africa policy along with competition with a rising China and increased Chinese engagement in Africa.

Before his first official trip to Kenya, U.S. President Barack Obama said, “Africa had become an idea more than an actual place . . . with the benefit of distance, we engaged Africa in a selective embrace.” This is probably an apt description of U.S. policy towards African nations despite the bipartisan nature of that policy. The United States, with the many domestic and international issues it has to cope with, can ill afford to continue to ignore Africa. Going forward, U.S. policy must include a hard-headed look at where Africa fits in policy priorities.

The incoming Biden administration will face a number of important issues and challenges as it develops its Africa policy. The most pressing issues are the following:

Climate Change: Climate change is an existential problem that affects the entire globe, but Africa has probably suffered more from the effects of climate change than other continents—and the problem will only get worse with time. In an October 2020 article, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Secretary-General Petteri Taalas said,

Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming specter of drought because of a La Nina event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Climate change impacts water quality and availability, and millions in Africa will likely face persistent increased water stress due to these impacts. A multi-year drought in parts of South Africa, for instance, threatened total water failure in several small towns and had livestock farmers facing financial ruin. Another pressing climate-change issue is the need for protection of the Congo Basin rainforest. This 178-million-hectare rainforest is the world’s second largest after the Amazon and is currently threatened by agricultural activities in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Countries in the Congo Basin need to address the preservation issue, while also enabling sustainable agricultural activities to ensure food security for the region’s population. In addition to the impact on global climate caused by destruction of the rainforest, such destruction also brings human populations into closer contact with the region’s animals, creating the risk of future animal-to-human transmission of new and possibly more virulent viruses similar to COVID-19, which will have a global impact. In a January 2021 CNN report, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe Tamfum, who as a researcher helped discover the Ebola virus in 1976, warned of possible new pathogens that could be as infectious as COVID-19 and as virulent as Ebola.

Rule of Law/Mitigation of Corruption: A key to African development, given the increasing urbanization, population increases, and youthfulness of the continent’s population, will be an increase in domestic and international investment to build the industries that can provide meaningful employment and improved standards of living. In order for this to be successful, African nations will need to address the issues of rule of law and corruption. Investors will not risk money if the business climate comes with a level of political risk that is too high. Government leaders throughout Africa need to establish legislation that provides an acceptable level of security for investments and take action to curb the endemic corruption that currently discourages investment. Corruption in Africa ranges from wholesale political corruption on the scale of General Sani Abachi’s looting of $3-5 billion of state money during his five years as Nigeria’s military ruler to the bribes paid by businessmen to police and customs officials. The “tradition” of having to pay bribes, or “sweeteners,” drives away domestic investment and scares away foreign investment, leaving many countries mired in poverty.

Violent Extremism and Terrorism: A number of African nations are currently plagued with rising extremist movements. While primarily a domestic issue, the mass movement of people fleeing violence and the disruption of economic activity have the potential to negatively impact the rest of the world. African nations need regional responses to curb extremist and terrorist organizations, many of which are supported by international terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. In addition, the underlying conditions that helped to create these movements must be addressed. Terrorist groups in Africa range from relatively large and dangerous groups, such as Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria that has received support from al Qaeda and that aims to implement sharia law in the country; Al-Shabab, an al Qaeda affiliate aiming to overthrow the government in Somalia and to punish neighboring countries for their support of the Somali regime; and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, a fundamentalist Christian group. Terrorist groups in the fragile political climate of Libya also pose a threat to sub-Saharan Africa.

Great Power Competition: As the world’s second-largest economy, and with its increasing participation in international activities, China will continue to be a factor in Africa for the foreseeable future. This, however, is more a problem for the nations of Africa than it is for the rest of the world. The West can compete best by outperforming China in areas of strength by providing those goods and services that are unquestionably superior, and let African governments decide how to deal with China and its often-predatory lending practices and the Chinese tendency to import Chinese workers for its projects and investments rather than hiring locals. At the same time, Russia, which did not completely turn away from Africa at the end of the Cold War as many in the West sometimes believe, must still be considered a significant factor on the African landscape. In an effort to compensate for Western sanctions and to counter U.S. and Western influence, Russia is once again increasing its presence on the continent. Russian mercenaries, in exchange for diamond mining rights, have trained military forces in the Central African Republic, raising concerns about human rights abuses. Of particular concern is the presence of the Wagner Group, a private military company associated with Yevgeny Progozhin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to Vladimir Putin, who was indicted in the United States for trying to disrupt the 2016 U.S. elections. To date, Russia has, in addition to seeking basing rights, signed military cooperation agreements with 28 African nations. Russian activity is a combination of military and commercial, with Progozhin at the center of both. From 2010 to 2018, Russia nearly tripled its trade with African countries. While the activities of both Russia and China in Africa are of concern, and should be closely monitored, neither is of critical importance to U.S. national security.

With climate change, disease outbreaks, famine, extremism, and inter-ethnic violence, Africa will still experience crises in the foreseeable future that will be beyond the capacity of most nations on the continent to deal with. Climate change is probably the greatest cause of humanitarian crises in Africa, but mainstream media outside the continent either fail to notice or under-report them. Some of the crises, like Ebola or the next viral infection, can impact the rest of the world. These crises will cause starvation, mass movement of people, and increase internal and regional instability. Africa matters to the United States and the rest of the world. Its impacts can be felt far beyond the continent’s borders, but if approached as a partner rather than as a patron—with a focus on assisting African nations to improve governance, build critical infrastructure, boost domestic economies, and provide essential services to all—then Africa can be a positive contributor on the global stage.

### 2ac – democracy bad – disease

#### Democracy makes disease control impossible

Zhifa Zhou 21, Associate Professor at the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University and Pan Qu, Postgraduate at the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, “The Root Cause of the Failure of American COVID-19 Governance Based on the Criticism of Liberal Democracy From Error-Tolerant Democracy”, Philosophy Study, Volume 11, Number 7, July 2021, https://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/60ff9cfb4589c.pdf

Introduction

Whether liberal democracy contributed to the COVID-19 governance was a hot topic in 2020 (“Democracy and Rise of Authoritarianism in COVID-19 World”, 2020). At the end of January, 2020, when COVID-19 witnessed the lockdown of Wuhan City, the West generally agreed that China lacked freedom of speech and the inertia of a rigid bureaucratic structure, and the national censorship system kept the whistle blower Dr. Wenliang Li silent, which led to the disease out of control (Mérieau, 2020). Democracies’ confidence mainly came from Amartya Sen’s research on the famine. Sen (1999) has claimed that no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press and there is no exception to this rule. Citizens in democracies can expect governments to be more candid, transparent, and responsible in dealing with all kinds of crises, which authoritarian countries usually cannot (Berengaut, 2020; Bollyky & Kickbusch, 2020). So Steve Bloomfield (2020) has regarded that if China had a free press and transparent government, the pandemic could be brought under control before the outbreak. In conclusion, freedom plus democracy equals the COVID-19 antidote according to Western standards, although Wilson and Wisongye have found that social media rumors can exploit the right to freedom of speech and erode people’s health benefits (New York Times, 2021; Bollyky & Kickbusch, 2020). However, since March, 2020, with Western democracies seriously affected by COVID-19, their superiority of the political system has begun to expose its untrue and fatal defects. Especially when Wuhan began to lift its blockade on April 8, 2020 (People.cn, 2020), scholars and journalists began to question whether democracies had the ability to deal with the crisis better than China (Mérieau, 2020). Liberal democracy in the United States has not proved that it is more conducive to the COVID-19 governance than authoritarianism since 2020. From a global perspective, not only do most democracies fail to contain the spread of COVID-19, but almost all of the 10 most affected countries are liberal democracies (Coronavirus Resource Center, 2021). Their policy responses have a poor effect in reducing the death toll in early stages of the crisis, as shown that democratic political institutions may be at a disadvantage in responding quickly to COVID-19 (Cepaluni, Dorsch, & Branyiczki, 2020). More surprising is that the COVID-19 pandemic is so serious in the United States, yet no government officials have been removed from office because of their inactivity in fighting against the corona-virus. People doubt whether American accountability mechanism is still working. However, two impeachments against President Trump indicate that it seems to function quite well (Valenta & Valenta, 2017; Herb, Raju, Fox, & Mattingly, 2021). The direct loss to the United States caused by Russiagate and incitement of insurrection is far less than the pain caused by the failure of the COVID-19 governance, but no any official in the United States is responsible for it. If it again faces infectious diseases similar to COVID-19, will it repeat this unprecedented tragedy? Can liberal democracy and the separation and balance of powers push American president to act more aggressively? Error-tolerantism explains that the fundamental reason for the failure of American COVID-19 governance is a serious misunderstanding of the concept of freedom (Zhou, 2018; 2019; Zhou, Tan, & Liu, 2020). Liberalism has witnessed a rare scene: In the context of COVID-19, the president, governors, magistrates, and the public (Emery, Schwebke, & Park, 2020; Sullum, 2020; Behrmann, 2020; Kenton, 2020; Strano, 2020) have severe misunderstanding of freedom that cost more than American 600,000 lives (Coronavirus Resource Center, 2021).

In response to the above phenomenon, error-tolerantism as the development of liberalism defines liberty from a new perspective and shows a stronger explanatory power than liberalism (Zhou et al., 2020). The right paradigm of error-tolerantism, the right to be wrong (right to trial and error) as an original right and mutual empowerment theory, instead of natural rights theory and social contract theory, divides liberty into the right to liberty in innovative fields, right to be wrong as an original right, and the right to be right in non-innovative fields as sub-rights. The lockdown of Wuhan means that Chinese government has excised the power to be wrong as an original power, but the West criticized it with the right to liberty at the level of sub-rights, which is the first error in understanding liberty during American COVID-19 governance; after Wuhan effectively controlled COVID-19, its governance has transformed from an innovative field to a non-innovative one. Then, liberties in non-innovative fields as the sub-rights level, such as wearing face masks, keeping social distancing, showing health codes, are formed definitely (Zhou et al., 2020). However, wearing masks has been regarded as a sign of political oppression rather than a simple hygienic measure by the United States (Kahanel, 2021). Since liberalism has a major misunderstanding of the concept of liberty, liberal democracy based on the philosophy of liberalism should be deeply reflected or even reconstructed, and it is very reasonable for error-tolerant democracy constructed based on error-tolerantism to explore the defects of liberal democracy in American COVID-19 governance. Therefore, we first review scholars’ relevant research on American democracy and the COVID-19 governance, and then based on the theory of error-tolerant democracy, discuss the defects of liberal democracy and American political system that are unable to cope with the crisis of the century.

#### Future pandemics are inevitable---extinction

Dr. Matt Boyd 21, Research Director at Adapt Research Ltd, PhD in Philosophy of Evolution & Cognition from the Victoria University of Wellington, BA from Massey University, and Nick Wilson, Research Professor in the Department of Public Health at the University of Otago, “Optimizing Island Refuges Against global Catastrophic and Existential Biological Threats: Priorities and Preparations”, Risk Analysis: An International Journal, Wiley Online Library

1 INTRODUCTION

Our world is vulnerable to global catastrophic risks (GCRs) or existential risks (Bostrom, 2019; Ord, 2020). GCRs are so disastrous because they affect one or more systems critical to humanity, and spread to affect the entire planet (Avin et al., 2018). Existential risks threaten to eliminate humanity or permanently curtail its potential (Ord, 2020). Some of these risks are natural, for example asteroid or comet impact, supervolcanic eruption, naturally occurring pandemic, or various cosmic events (Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2008; Ord, 2020). Many others are the result of human activities, for example nuclear war, anthropogenic climate change, nonaligned artificial intelligence, engineered biological threats, geoengineering, or inescapable totalitarianism (Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2008; Ord, 2020).

There are three phases to an existential catastrophe: origin, scale up, and reaching every last human (Cotton-Barratt, Daniel, & Sandberg, 2020). Following any near miss, there would be a period where recovery of humanity's long-term potential may or may not be realized (Baum et al., 2019). Failure to anticipate or mitigate these threats risks undesirable trajectories for human civilization (Baum et al., 2019).

In addition to the present generation's obvious self-interest in continuing to exist, the perspective of long-termism suggests that humanity ought to mitigate these risks due to the potential immense value of future human generations (Beckstead, 2013), a desire to see aspects of the human project continue across time and perhaps the universe (Bostrom, 2003; Scheffler, 2013), and the potential cosmic significance of preserving intelligent life on Earth (Ord, 2020). A number of philosophical defenses of long-termism have been published (Beckstead, 2013; Greaves & MacAskill, 2019). Importantly, these long-term outcomes are largely under human control because most of the risk is probably anthropogenic (Beard & Torres, 2020; Ord, 2020).

1.1 Mitigating Existential Threats

It is too simplistic to think of existential risks as mere causes that are followed by a sequence of effects. We should think of risks as the product of hazards, vulnerabilities, and exposures (Liu, Lauta, & Maas, 2018). Hazards are the precipitating cause of a catastrophe, vulnerabilities are the inability of critical systems to withstand hazards, and exposures are the features of human society that turn this system damage into harm to populations (Beard & Torres, 2020). Mitigation of existential threats involves preventing their emergence, responding if the threat spreads, and building resilience so the threat does not lead to the death of every last human or leave humanity with permanently curtailed prospects (Cotton-Barratt et al., 2020). After a threat has passed, there may also be a series of limiters that might prevent the reemergence of a flourishing humanity (Baum et al., 2019). One such limiting factor could be the loss of technological society and know-how.

In order to achieve immunity from existential threat, humanity will need a period where it preserves its potential and protects itself from risks (Ord, 2020). Various methods have been proposed to address vulnerabilities and hence shift the probability of existential risk. These suggestions include: improved international focus, governance, and cooperation such as through the United Nations (Boyd & Wilson, 2020), imitating existing frameworks such as the Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction (Avin et al., 2018), achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (Cernev & Fenner, 2020), or extreme surveillance for threats (Bostrom, 2019). Toby Ord lists 38 specific measures across eight existential threats, and an additional 12 avenues to explore that address risks in general terms (Ord, 2020).

1.2 Biological Threats

Pandemic viruses with high case fatality could potentially infect a majority of the population. Deliberate biological events (DBEs) have occurred before (Millet & Snyder-Beattie, 2017a), will likely occur again, and could pose a threat to humans as great as nuclear war (Kosal, 2020). New technologies such as artificial intelligence could amplify biothreats in a number of ways (O'Brien & Nelson, 2020). These risks are increased because the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has no verification system (Dando, 2016), and has been violated in the past (Gronvall, 2018). It would only take one unanticipated or accidental event for a bioweapon (or laboratory accident) to become a catastrophic threat. The U.S. National Academies of Sciences specifically warns against synthetic biology and xenobiology (Gomez-Tatay & Hernandez-Andreu, 2019) and it is argued that a state-sponsored bioweapon attack is the greatest current threat (Sandberg & Nelson, 2020). See the Supporting Information for further details on biological threats. Global preparedness through the One Health approach, global health security projects, and the need to integrate health and the GCR field (Millet & Snyder-Beattie, 2017b) are important. But as the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, there may be important overlooked aspects or misunderstood risks that could make any suite of general preparation inadequate. Therefore, last lines of defense may be required, such as refuges.

### 2ac – democracy bad – warming

#### Existential warming is inevitable AND causes a collapse into extreme authoritarianism---only transitioning from democracy solves

Dr. Chien-Yi Lu 21, PhD and MA in Government from the University of Texas, Austin, Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica, Surviving Democracy: Mitigating Climate Change in a Neoliberalized World, Paperback Edition, 12/13/2021, p. 1-2

The fact that the scientific knowledge on the human contribution to climate change entered human society through the most advanced democratic societies should have been a cause for celebration. Given the congruence of climate mitigation and public interests, the problem of climate change should have been considered solved decades ago. Several decades of inaction later, however, arguments are proliferating that democracy is exactly the reason for inaction.

In The Collapse of Western Civilization, historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway travel to the future to look back and offer a forensic analysis on the climate-induced Great Collapse of Western Civilization of 2074 (2014: 63). The future historians’ forensic report states that “[a]s the devastating effects of the Great Collapse began to appear, the nation-states with democratic governments… were at first unwilling and then unable” to deal with the crisis. These democratic governments realized that they had no “infrastructure and organizational ability to quarantine and relocate people” as “food shortages and disease outbreaks spread and sea level[s] rose.” In China, where there was centralized government, the crisis was handled much more adequately, leading to survival rates exceeding 80%, a development that “vindicated the necessity of centralized government” (2014: 51–2). The gist of The Collapse of Western Civilization is not about critiquing democracy per se but a warning against the stubborn inaction mandated by market fundamentalism that has hijacked Western democracies.1 In their previous book, Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Conway documented the way that climate deniers sowed the seeds of doubt about climate change and successfully staved off implementations of mitigation measures. For the authors, the anticommunist ideology that had kept actors vigilant about government encroachment in the marketplace occupied a central place in climate denial (2014: 69). Ironically, this sort of ideology-informed calculation meant that preventative action was blocked, increasing the risk that disruptive climate disasters would eventually necessitate the suspension of democracy and legitimating the sort of heavy-handed authoritarian interventions that the conservatives most abhorred (2014: 52; 69).

An appeal to suspend democracy for the sake of survival can be found in The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, where Shearman and Smith argue that liberal democracy is incompatible with the urgent necessity to prevent catastrophic climate change. The vested interests of politicians, corporations, and media lie in continuing with business as usual and in keeping the public ignorant. Instead of bottom-up reforms to improve democracy and bring about sensible climate policies, Shearman and Smith see a transformation into authoritarian regimes as the only responsible way forward when faced with the extreme ecological stress of climate change. They point out that, as Plato foresaw, those in power in a democracy are seldom able to resist the demands of the populace for long, but as a mass, the populace is seldom able to focus on complex problems and to perceive threats that lie over the horizon. Hence, those able to see further—scientists, experts, and the knowledgeable— should be entrusted with steering the course while there is still time to avoid disaster. It is only under a benign authoritarian rule of the knowledgeable that a saner, fairer, and more rational means of weighing social goods against evils can be introduced (Shearman and Smith, 2007).

#### The public is an idiocracy. ‘Pressure’ cannot be productive.

Dr. Stuart Parker 20, Philosopher and Former Teacher who Lectured on Philosophy and Education at London's Institute of Education, South Bank University, Author of Reflective Teaching in the Postmodern World, “The Problem With Democracy — It's You”, The Article, 10/5/2020, https://www.thearticle.com/the-problem-with-democracy-its-you

So why is our democracy so unfit for purpose? Why is it that we can elect leaders who are little more than self-serving schemers, whose contempt for the electorate renders them incapable of giving straight, honest answers to even the most straightforward, reasonable questions? It’s not as if any of these qualities have been smuggled in under our noses. They are paraded before our eyes every single day. Nobody voting for Johnson or Trump could ~~be blind to the fact~~ [ignore] that they are serial liars. And yet they voted all the same. Why?

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Mencken was on to something when suggesting that the leaders we get, the leaders we deserve, closely represent something dark in the inner soul of the people. There’s no easy way to put this — the problem with democracy is the voters. The voters simply aren’t good enough to support a healthy democracy. They’re not up to the job. Now I know some will think: a snowflake-remainer-lefty-loser will always blame the voters just as a bad workman always blames his tools. But these tools are shot.

Consider this: a poll in 2005 found that 21 per cent of Americans believe in witches and 9 per cent that spirits can take control of a person. In 1999, 18 per cent believed the sun revolves around the earth — so much for “the science” — and in 2000, 31 per cent believed in ghosts, and increase of 20 percentage points since 1978.

By 2019, the year before Trump’s re-election attempt, significant numbers believed in the illuminati, Big-foot and a flat earth. Ghost-belief had risen to 45 per cent, as had the belief in demons. Belief in vampires stood at a fangtastic 13 per cent.

Britain has nothing to be proud of. While 33 per cent of us believe in ghosts and 18 per cent in demonic possession, a whopping 52 per cent of us believe that you can magically make a false claim true simply by writing it on the side of a bus.

In elective dictatorships where small margins have huge consequences we’d better get used to the fact that (possibly small) groups with stupid ideas and a lack of relevant knowledge and skills can have a disproportionate effect on the lives of the rest of us.

### --- 1ar – xt: no dpt / causes war

#### This is true in all scenarios, including against other democracies

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We now turn to the results from the outcome stage, where militarized conflict initiation is regressed on democracy measures and other covariates. The univariate clog-log model 32 that ignores the endogeneity, shown in column (1) in Table 1, successfully replicates the standard, dyadic democratic peace finding that democracies are peaceful, though only toward other democracies. Note that, while individual democracy measures have either a positive or insignificant coefficient, joint democracy has a negative coefficient that overwhelms the positive coefficients of individual democracy measures in the univariate model. As a result, the univariate model produces a result that, while democracy may increase conflict against a non-democracy, it decreases conflict against a democracy.

To illustrate this, we calculate the average treatment effect of joint democracy for the challenger and for the target based on the univariate model. These effects are calculated by comparing the predicted probabilities of conflict initiation when changing the regime type of self (challenger or target) from non-democracy to democracy, holding constant the regime type of the other (target or challenger) as democracy. 33 Gray, hollow circles in Figure 4 show the treatment effects of challenger’s and target’s democracy. We can see that both effects are negative and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.

Once we correct the endogeneity, however, the data no longer support such conclusions. In column (2) in Table 1, the negative coefficient for joint democracy no longer overwhelms the positive coefficient of challenger’s democracy. Challenger’s democracy now appears to increase conflict even against a democratic target. Red, solid circles in Figure 4 show the average treatment effects of challenger’s and target’s democracy, calculated from the trivariate model. The effect is positive and statistically significant for challenger’s democracy, although the effect is indistinguishable from zero for target’s democracy.

Whether we correct for endogeneity thus makes a significant difference in our estimates of the effect of joint democracy on conflict. The key to understanding why these changes occur lies in the estimated correlations between the error terms for different equations. The estimated error correlation between equations for conflict and challenger’s democracy, 12, is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that unobservable or unmeasured determinants of a country’s democracy make it less likely for that country to attack another country. A failure to control for such factors would generate a negative omitted variable bias, making it look as if challenger’s democracy has a pacifying effect on conflict behavior. On the other hand, the estimated error correlation between conflict and target’s democracy equations, 13, is indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the endogeneity problem does not seem to operate for target’s regime type.

#### It's an empirical question, answered by statistical methods---failing to code based on exogenous variables corrupts their evidence

Dr. Daina Chiba 21, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, and Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf

Before we review our approach in detail, it may be useful to explain why this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past and what makes our effort different from other, broadly related projects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework (more specifically) or multi-equation models (more broadly) to the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad (country pair) as the unit of observation in analyzing conflict, which requires some summary measure(s) of democracy for a pair of countries rather than the state-level (monadic) democracy measure. 6 Use of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level). 7 We avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations (predicting the challenger’s and target’s regime types) and the outcome stage equation seamlessly. Doing so has several benefits: the outcome stage model could directly include country-level covariates (such as challenger’s and target’s democracy) without having to convert them to a dyadic summary. This also allows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.” 8

Second, a more daunting challenge in applying an IV approach to democratic peace research is the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study of the effect of regime type on economic growth uses a diffusion-based measure of democracy (i.e., average value of democracies in a given region) as an instrument for democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2019). However, diffusion-based instruments such as this are unlikely to be a valid instrument, due to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and, most importantly, simultaneity (Betz, Cook, and Hollenbach 2018). Recognizing problems with spatial instruments, McDonald (2015) seeks to exploit the very discrepancy between country-level and dyad-level designs as the source of identification. His discussion, however, lacks a clear explanation as to why some determinants of regime type do not influence conflict. 9

We turn to a demographic variable — average female fertility rate in a given country — as a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict. As we will argue below, a lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization. We will also present theoretical arguments and a series of falsification tests that support the claim that average national fertility rate does not directly influence international conflict.

### --- 1ar – transition wars

#### The move to democracy doubles the risk of quick conflict AND goes nuclear

Dr. Edward Mansfield 22, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science and Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, and Dr. Jack Snyder, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, BA in Government from Harvard University, Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, Sixth Edition, Ed. Betts, p. 331-332

DANGERS OF TRANSITION

The idea that democracies never fight wars against each other has become an axiom for many scholars. It is, as one scholar puts it, “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” This “law” is invoked by American statesmen to justify a foreign policy that encourages democratization abroad. In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton asserted that no two democracies had ever gone to war with each other, thus explaining why promoting democracy abroad was a pillar of his foreign policy.

It is probably true that a world in which more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. But countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy—like contemporary Russia—are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.

This historical pattern of democratization, belligerent nationalism, and war is already emerging in some of today’s new or partial democracies, especially some formerly communist states. Two pairs of states—Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan—have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of electoral democracy. The electorate of Russia’s partial democracy cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Even mainstream Russian politicians have adopted an imperial tone in their dealings with neighboring former Soviet republics, and military force has been used ruthlessly in Chechnya.

The following evidence should raise questions about the Clinton administration’s policy of promoting peace by promoting democratization. The expectation that the spread of democracy will probably contribute to peace in the long run, once new democracies mature, provides little comfort to those who might face a heightened risk of war in the short run. Pushing nuclear-armed great powers like Russia or China toward democratization is like spinning a roulette wheel: many of the outcomes are undesirable. Of course, in most cases the initial steps on the road to democratization will not be produced by any conscious policy of the United States. The roulette wheel is already spinning for Russia and perhaps will be soon for China. Washington and the international community need to think not so much about encouraging or discouraging democratization as about helping to smooth the transition in ways that minimize its risks.

### --- 1ar – xt: nigeria link

#### Spending on elections diverts from public services and locks in wealth inequality

Dr. Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 21, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, PhD in Political Science and MSc from the University of Nigeria, et al., “Does Liberal Democracy Promote Economic Development? Interrogating Electoral Cost and Development Trade-Off in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, Cogent Social Sciences, Volume 7, Issue 1, 4/28/2021, Taylor & Francis Online

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The debate on the suitability of liberal democracy in supporting economic development in post-colonial African states has unabatedly continued to remain at the centre of current intellectual discourses and conversations. Although scholars seem to be focused on the endogenous constraints to the capacity of liberal democracy in generating the expected development outcome, specific attention is yet to be paid on how exorbitant spending on elections undermines human development in Nigeria. This study therefore argues that the electoral timetable of a 4-year tenure system renewable only once, which sustains exorbitant public expenditure on elections is antithetical to the human development drive of the Nigerian state. It diverts public spending, incapacitates the state from addressing the economic priority needs of the people, and deepens the gap between the rich and poor. Redesigning and retuning the content of liberal democracy in line with the demands, peculiarities and realities of the Nigerian state are highly recommended in the study.

#### That creates a time bomb that’ll inevitably implode stability---abandoning democracy’s key

Moses E. Ochonu 19, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in History and Professor of African History at Vanderbilt University, PhD and MA in African History from the University of Michigan, BA in History from Bayero University, Graduate Certificate in Conflict Management from Liscomb University, “Why Liberal Democracy is a Threat to Nigeria’s Stability”, Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, May 2019, <http://logosjournal.com/2019/liberal-democracy-is-a-threat-to-nigerias-stability/> [language modified]

The Real Cost of Democracy

Aside from the aforementioned financial cost of elections and patronage, other expenditures bring the recurring cost of the Nigeria’s 20-year democratic project into tens of billions of dollars, an expense that will sooner or later ~~cripple~~ [ruin] the country financially. Let me expatiate. A recent report confirmed what many Nigerians have long suspected about the remunerations of their elected executive and legislative leaders: Nigerian elected public office holders at all levels of government are the highest paid in the world.[5] Together with their string of assistants and advisors (who sometimes have their own paid advisors), Nigeria’s public officers gobble up at least half of the nation’s revenue and budgetary appropriations in legitimate rewards.

This prohibitive democratic overhead has left the country with a smaller pool of funds than ever to invest in the things that matter to Nigerians: roads, healthcare, schools, water, electricity, and food production. This odd reality of low returns on democratic investment is unsustainable. Something has to give.

What is being eroded is the very stability of the state, along with any trust that citizens still have in it. This is a proverbial ticking time bomb that will implode or explode if the trend continues, if this democracy endures. Twenty years since the return of civilian rule, it is not an exaggeration to say that not only has democracy not paid off for Nigeria but that it is now a threat to its stability and survival. This is a radical shift that has occurred stealthily and has thus been missed by the Western governmental and non-governmental actors that encouraged and funded democratic advocacy in the 1990s.

#### The two-party system creates polarization, social violence, and instability

Dr. Aloysius-Michaels Okolie 21, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, PhD in Political Science and MSc from the University of Nigeria, et al., “Does Liberal Democracy Promote Economic Development? Interrogating Electoral Cost and Development Trade-Off in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”, Cogent Social Sciences, Volume 7, Issue 1, 4/28/2021, Taylor & Francis Online

The hitches and abnormalities characterising Nigeria’s electoral democracy are, no doubt, intrinsically linked to the institutionalised two-tenure renewable system. This tenure system was externally supported by the purveyors of liberal democracy and domesticated by the local accomplices solely for self-interest. In Nigeria, the winner-takes-all mentality as well as the high stakes usually associated with political offices heightens electoral contestations among the competing, polarised and distrusted ethnic nationalities who perceive political power as a means of advancing their peculiar economic interests. The struggle is usually intensified when it is obvious that access to state power guarantees an unfettered gateway to huge petro-dollar revenue. Indeed, the incumbent’s penchant for re-election often reinforces the tendency for divisiveness, violence, rancour and instability. For instance, the re-election bid of the then President Goodluck Jonathan in 2015 accounted for the deaths of 106 people while the election-related conflict in 2011 led to the deaths of 800 people and the displacement of 65,000 (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; Harwood, 2019). The two-tenure system affects governance and policy responses since incumbent officials seeking re-election often devote a substantial part of their time and energy in politicking and grandstanding for a favourable outcome. This manifested in the 2015 and 2019 re-elections of Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, respectively, in Nigeria when both leaders abandoned their jobs for campaigns. Also, given the monetised and winner-takes-all approach of Nigerian politics, incumbent candidates ruthlessly divert public funds for re-election campaigns. It drains the national treasury and redirects public expenditure to campaign funding rather than to human and capital development. A classic example is the ongoing investigation into the Office of the National Security Adviser which, at the interim, has revealed that the sum of 2.1 USD billion appropriated for procurement of military equipments was diverted and used to prosecute the 2015 general elections for the Peoples Democratic Party.

#### That implodes the country---autocracy solves

Dr. Moses E. Ochonu 20, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in History and Professor of African History at Vanderbilt University, PhD and MA in African History from the University of Michigan, BA in History from Bayero University, Graduate Certificate in Conflict Management from Liscomb University, “Liberal Democracy Has Failed in Nigeria”, Africa Is a Country, 2/7/2020, <https://africasacountry.com/2020/02/liberal-democracy-has-failed-in-nigeria> [language modified]

Liberal democracy’s capstone ritual, zero-sum elections, endow winners with all the rewards of victory—millions of dollars in licit and illicit earnings, local and international political visibility, and power. The loser, conversely, gets nothing. The result is a high-stakes version of what is called FOMO, or the fear of missing out, in American popular lingo. This fear of political exclusion in turn catalyzes desperation, which consistently and predictably produces messy, violent, and compromised elections.

In addition, since its return to civilian rule in 1999, liberal democracy has been an unacceptably costly enterprise for Nigeria. In 2019, the country spent about $670 million on a general election widely condemned as a sham. With budget financing increasingly steeped in external and internal debt, and given the fungibility of state funds, there is a depressing possibility that Nigeria is borrowing to fund elections and to finance its fledgling democratic institutions and processes. It’s a hefty price tag in a country where most people subsist on less than $2 a day. When this financial outlay is added to Nigeria’s notoriety for having some of the highest paid legislators in the world and for spending the national fortune to maintain a large army of elected and appointed civilian officials, the unsustainability of this “democratic” trajectory emerges in full relief.

It is not just the fiscal cost of elections and civilian administration that threatens to ~~cripple~~ [destroy] Nigeria. The social cost of this “democratic” adventure poses the most potent threat to the country. Plural, adversarial, and zero-sum elections have frayed the social fabric and undermined the cohesion of a notoriously fragile country. As mentioned previously, elections have been marked—and marred—by killings, displacement, scorched earth violence, and malicious manipulations. Electoral contests are little more than political warfare between factions of Nigeria’s political elite for access to the country’s resources.

The result of this charade has been a steady trend of voter apathy, represented by declining voter turnout, which stood at 35 percent in 2019. Nigerians are communicating their disillusionment with this iteration of democracy. Without urgent, profound reforms, the current path may destroy the country. It is no longer enough to argue that the current challenges are mere setbacks on the path to democratic maturity, or that escalating “democratic” tyranny is an aberration.

### --- 1ar – xt: nigeria impact

#### It spills into the Middle East and South Asia---nuclear war

Walter Mead 13, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care”, The American Interest, 12/15/2013, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/>

The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends.

Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.

#### Boko Haram will get CBRNs---extinction

Dr. Bernard B. Fyanka 20, Ph.D. in History and Strategic Studies from the University of Lagos, Akoka Lagos Nigeria, "Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism: Rethinking Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy", African Security Review, Volume 28, Issue 3-4, 2/17/2020, Taylor & Francis Online

The end of the Cold War might have represented the end of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but it did not necessarily dispel the dangers of the nuclear age – in fact, to some extent the globalised proliferation of non-conventional weapons has instead escalated the possibilities for a nuclear attack being carried out. During the Cold War, the belligerents of any nuclear conflict would have been easily identifiable; however, in the post-Cold-War era, non-state actors and terrorist groups like Boko Haram have emerged as potential players in a new variety of nuclear conflicts that would entirely be based on terrorist models. The ominous possibilities for this new kind of warfare are indeed terrifying, and the rise in terrorist attacks around the globe enhances the likelihood of such an occurrence. Since 9/11, the body of academic literature on the threat posed by terrorists regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices has increased. In Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett’s edited volume, Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, there is disagreement as to whether this threat is overestimated or underestimated.1 In recent times, however, ample ideological incentive for the use of CBRN devices has been provided by the likes of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri – author of the ‘Global Islamic Resistance Call’ – who has stated that ‘[t]he aim of carrying out resistance missions and individual jihad terrorism “jihad al-irhabi al-fardi” is to inflict the largest human and material casualties possible on American interests and its allied countries’.2 This echoes the previous call of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Husayni al-Baghdadi, who maintained:

If the objective and subjective conditions materialize, and there are soldiers, weapons, and money – even if this means using biological, chemical, and bacterial weapons – we will conquer the world, so that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet’ will be triumphant over the domes of Moscow, Washington, and Paris.3

For Boko Haram and other groups, there definitely exists a strong motivation for the use of WMDs, and the global reach of this thinking is not in doubt:

The globalization of the jihadist struggle has also led to an increased emphasis on Islamic identity. In combination with the ideological theme of revenge, the global struggle for Islamic identity has the potential to create a new jihadist cultic worldview in which its endorsers seek out WMDs because they represent the only means to significantly transform reality.4

Contextual scenarios in Nigeria strongly suggest that Boko Haram is one such group which has embraced the jihadist world view that endorses the use of WMDs. In this regard, the strengthened affiliation of Boko Haram’s splinter group – the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) confirms their ideological persuasions. The motivation for Boko Haram to use such weapons is thus grounded in the recent use of chemical weapons by ISIS in both Iraq and Syria against both military and civilian targets.5 If ISIS is claiming ownership of a faction of Boko Haram as its West African province, it is likely to extend its tactics to its African allies.

In the light of the above, the use of WMDs by terrorists cannot be explained within the framework of orthodox terrorism theories. With this in mind, what Russell Worth Parker refers to as the ‘Islamic just war theory’ suitably anchors a discourse on terrorism and advanced weapons of war.6 Most theorists do not support a subjective theory of ‘just war’, but rather the traditional version that relies on Western ideas of morality and proportionality, as well as on motives for waging war.7 On the other hand, jihadist traditions reinterpret just war’s key tenet of proportionality to suit Islamists’ conflict rationale. According to the Western form of just war theory, wherein discrimination proves strategically impossible, any response should be proportionate to the action that compels it – hence, proportionality dictates that a military operation should not cause greater harm than the act that it was designed to counter or prevent.8 This proportionality argument is exemplified in the use of nuclear weapons in the Second World War; since casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan exceeded one million Allied lives, with similar estimates for Japanese military and civilians, a nuclear attack was preferable. Eventually, the actual casualties suffered from the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reached 200,000, which represents 10% of the casualties that would likely have been incurred if Japan had been invaded (see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/). In the light of this argument, justification for the use of WMDs by terrorist groups would rest on their interpretation of the extent of the damage caused by the military aggression and long-term imperialism of Western powers.

Fighting faceless enemies in a CBRN conflict, whether in West Africa or the Middle East, is hard to imagine. Enemies who can easily blend into the crowd and take on the face of ordinary civilians represent a nightmare scenario for security strategists all around the world. The risk of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorist groups is largely dependent on their ability to obtain weapons-grade nuclear material like uranium and plutonium, combined with gaining the capability to build and deploy weapons which make use of them. The global proliferation of nuclear material has made this possible today.

Global proliferation of fissile material

The collapse of the Soviet military-industrial complex ushered in a period of uncertainty regarding the security of nuclear material. Consequently, the risk of fissile material falling into the hands of terrorist groups – or into the hands of states that sympathise with or harbour such groups – increased considerably. Lax security at former Soviet nuclear facilities was widespread, making the theft of nuclear material possible. In the chaos that followed the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s, radioactive material was frequently stolen from poorly guarded reactors and nuclear facilities in Russia and its former satellite states. Police operations have intercepted shipments of Soviet nuclear material in cities as far away as Munich and Prague, and experts believe that large batches are still unaccounted for and most likely accessible to well-connected traders on the black market.9

Over 1800 metric tons of nuclear material is still stored in facilities belonging to more than 25 countries all around the world.10 Not all of this material is located in military stockpiles – in fact, most countries maintain civil stockpiles of plutonium for use in nuclear power reactors. The civil stockpiles in the United Kingdom (UK), India, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan and Russia add up to over 230 metric tons of plutonium. In spite of these enormous quantities, the UK, India, France, Japan and Russia have not yet reduced the reprocessing of plutonium for civil use. Although civil plutonium is not weapons-grade, it remains viable as a raw material that can be transformed through an enrichment process for use in a bomb. The United States (US) on the other hand has a comparatively small amount of civil plutonium because of its 1970 policy to suspend the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel.11

About 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is required to build a bomb – an insignificant amount in comparison to the global stockpile, which is in excess of 1.6 million kg. On the other hand, about 8 kg of plutonium is needed to build a bomb – a tiny fraction of the 500,000 kg global stockpile.12 Nuclear facilities that are relics of the Cold War era, especially those located in Eastern Europe, represent a high security risk. More than 130 nuclear reactors powered by HEU are operational in over 40 countries – the fallout of an early Cold-War-era programme in which the US and the Soviet Union helped their allies to obtain nuclear technology. Several other reactors have been shut down but may still contain nuclear fuel on site. In total, the world’s research reactors contain 22 tons of HEU – enough to build hundreds of nuclear bombs. The problem is that research reactor fuel tends to be stored under notoriously light security, making it a very vulnerable target for terrorists.13

In 2004, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a report that details security lapses at civilian nuclear installations, citing a case in which the fences surrounding an unnamed foreign research reactor were in very poor condition and there were no guards securing the reactor building itself. In this report, Harvard expert Matthew Bunn explains that unlike the bulky and extremely radioactive fuel rods used in commercial nuclear power plants, research reactor fuel consists of small pellets that weigh only a few pounds each and moreover are easier to handle –a simple backpack can conceal several pellets.14 Naturally, civilian stockpiles are at greater risk of theft than those held in military installations. Consequently, the possibilities of such dangerous material falling into the hands of terrorists groups have become increasingly plausible.

Regarding military stockpiles, Russia and the US possess the largest amounts of weapons-grade plutonium – 100 and 150 metric tons, respectively. Diplomatic attempts aimed at reducing these stockpiles have resulted in an agreement for the two countries to dispose of 34 metric tons each via the method of turning the weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for nuclear power reactors. Although this agreement has not been effected yet, it is obvious given the above that the process may expose the material to greater risk of theft rather than securing it.15 On the other hand, in 2005 the US Congress eliminated the long-standing restrictions that were placed on the exporting of HEU to other countries for the purpose of manufacturing medical isotopes, which has also created new avenues for the proliferation of nuclear material through civilian use.16

Although the civilian use of nuclear material has increased the risk of its proliferation, the military facilities currently holding nuclear material around the world – especially in Russia – are also not well secured. Thousands of Cold-War-era tactical weapons are stored at very poorly guarded military installations, and most of these weapons are small and do not have electronic locks that prevent unauthorised usage.17 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no viable security strategy for securing the nuclear material contained in many of the former empire’s cities. During the Cold War era, the citizens of these cities had access to these facilities – and they still do, a problem further compounded by the fact that a strict inventory of the nuclear material contained in these facilities is not maintained.18

The likes of infamous arms dealer Leonid Minin (who was found guilty in a court of law for supplying weapons to non-state actors in African conflicts) are all too willing to do business with terrorists.19, 20 Arms dealers and smugglers all over the world are always seeking lucrative opportunities, and it is almost certain that some nuclear material has already been acquired by dangerous fanatics.

Several incidents in recent decades give every reason to believe that this is the case. In 1993, Kazakhstani authorities discovered HEU capable of arming 20 bombs in a building that was poorly secured.21 In 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia for carrying 100 g of HEU and attempting to find a buyer for what he claimed was many additional kilograms.22 In 2011, six men with 4 g of uranium were arrested by security forces in Moldova. Upon questioning, they claimed that the 4 g represented a sample of the product they were ready to market. They claimed to possess an additional 9kg, which represents one third of the quantity needed to create a nuclear weapon. The leader of this group and the North African buyer escaped.23 Four years before this incident, gunmen raided a facility in Pelindaba, South Africa; the details of the event are still shrouded in mystery.24

Efforts by terrorist organisations to purchase and use nuclear weapons continue unabated. The most high profile of these known efforts is that of Osama bin Laden, who in 2001 attempted to purchase a canister of uranium in Sudan for US$1.5 million. Intelligence reports claim that he also met with two Pakistani nuclear scientists, and sketches of nuclear weapons were found at an al-Qaeda training camp.25

From the foregoing, it is clear that there exists a robust and thriving black market in fissile material that seems to be tailor-made for use by terrorists groups. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as at December 2015 had recorded in its trafficking database a total of 2889 incidents involving losses, thefts and/or attempts to traffic fissile material across international borders.26 This is an incredibly high rate of security lapses considering the security priority that nuclear facilities are supposed to possess. More pressing is the fact that the agency does not inspect every nuclear facility globally, and as such is not in a position to comprehensively enforce strict security and safety regulations. As a consequence of this, fissile material often goes missing and subsequently appears on the black market without being reported to the agency. Furthermore, several nations which maintain nuclear facilities do not possess the requisite resources to subject employees to the kind of extensive background checks that can ensure their trustworthiness for working at such high-security sites. In the absence of this screening, the likelihood of people with terrorist ties applying for jobs at nuclear facilities for the purpose of obtaining nuclear material is very high.

There is mounting evidence worldwide that increasing amounts of fissile material are being stolen and traded. Although the Russian government refuses to admit that it has lost any nuclear weapons, at least four Russian nuclear submarines have sunk, and it is believed that the warheads on board are yet to be recovered. The US on the other hand has admitted to losing a staggering 11 nuclear weapons.27

How can Boko Haram obtain nuclear material?

Boko Haram is one of the deadliest terrorist groups in the world. Since 2009, it has engaged with the Nigerian state in a lethal terrorism campaign aimed at toppling the secular structure and replacing it with an Islamist state. By May 2014 over 12,000 Nigerians had been killed in the insurgency,28 while one in five persons from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states had been internally displaced. According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram ranks as the second deadliest terrorist group in the world, with an all-time high death toll of over 6000 in 2014 alone.29

With known ties to al-Qaeda, Boko Haram has an estimated annual income in excess of US$25 million.30 By 2017, Boko Haram had been forced to retreat from the large areas it had previously occupied in the north-east of Nigeria, driven back by the joint international military efforts of several countries in West and Central Africa. This created the need for them to reassert themselves. The likelihood of this group re-strategising and reconsolidating is high. Consequently, their acquisition of fissile material for the development and deployment of radiological ‘dirty bombs’ has increased in probability. The availability of this material on the continent and within Nigeria itself presents ominous opportunities for the group. Apart from large deposits of uranium ore found in Africa, several countries including South Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria itself presently possess nuclear research reactors.31

The IAEA has reported no less than 12 incidents of natural uranium smuggling between 1995 and 2005 in Africa alone. In fact, illegal uranium mining at the Shinkolobwe mine in Katanga, DRC is presently a source of great concern. More importantly, this is where the source material for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was obtained.32 The proliferation of fissile material across the continent heightens the possibility of non-state actors like Boko Haram gaining access to it. Although there has only been one recorded theft of eight uranium fuel rods from a Kinshasa research reactor in 1997, the disturbing fact about this is that seven of the rods were never recovered.33

Within Nigeria itself, opportunities abound for terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other militant organisations to obtain fissile material for use in nuclear devices or dirty bombs. In 2004, Nigeria commissioned a 30-kW miniature neutron source reactor (NIRR-1) for the purpose of nuclear energy research.34 This nuclear facility is located at the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria in the north of the country, where terrorist activities and Islamist extremism have been going on for centuries. The possibility of Islamist extremists infiltrating nuclear facilities and smuggling out fissile material has been an ongoing security concern for a number of years. An outright attack on a lightly secured facility is a second possibility that actually played out in 2007, when a nuclear research facility in Pelindaba, South Africa was raided by armed assailants, who breached its security perimeter and gained entry.35 Another concern is unsecured radioactive waste – namely 234 legacy sources presently located at the Ajaokuta Steel Company in Kogi State – that has not been disposed of and could easily be obtained by Boko Haram.36 To complicate matters further, the construction of a low to medium radioactive waste management facility at Nigeria’s Nuclear Technology Centre has been abandoned.37

Can Boko Haram build and use non-conventional weapons?

The poor state of nuclear security combined with the tenacity of Boko Haram makes Nigeria a prime location for the advent of nuclear terrorism. Knowhow on building a nuclear device is widely available, as is the key component, HEU, which can be found all over the world in dozens of military and civilian nuclear facilities – like the one at Ahmadu Bello University. Once Boko Haram has obtained enough HEU, a choice can be made between two types of nuclear device. The first is the gun-type mechanism, in which the HEU is smashed together to produce an explosion. The second type, which is more advanced, requires a chamber in which the HEU is compressed in a highly symmetrical manner in order to create an implosion. The gun-type mechanism is the more likely option for terrorist groups because it is simpler.38

In order to use the gun-type mechanism to activate a nuclear device, Boko Haram operatives would need to assemble a crude cannon that can smash HEU together – and the more highly enriched the uranium, the less advanced the weaponry that is needed. The viability of any terrorist group accomplishing such a task has been tested by US senator Joe Biden. In 2004 he asked scientists at three national laboratories to see if they could assemble the mechanical components of a gun-type bomb with commercially available equipment alone. A few months later, they reported back that they had succeeded.39 With over US$25 million in annual income, Boko Haram has the resources to obtain both the scientific knowhow and the materials needed to build and deploy a gun-type nuclear weapon.

Radiological dirty bombs

The threat of non-conventional weapons proliferation and terrorism goes beyond nuclear weapons – it also encompasses radiological dirty bombs. The raw materials used to create nuclear weapons are very dangerous; they contain highly radioactive substances that would pose a serious health hazard if dispersed in human populations using a detonation device. Plutonium and uranium could thus be weaponised in the form of a radiological dirty bomb, also known as a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which would cause widespread fatalities and cost billions of dollars in clean-up, evacuation and relocation operations.40

Terrorist groups like Boko Haram could easily build and use an RDD, given the widespread proliferation of fissile material – and more importantly given the dual-use materials that can produce the same radiological effects as fissile material from nuclear installations. Radiological dual-use materials from smoke alarms and medical services are among the most easily accessible; highly radioactive isotopes are in fact used in life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments in hospitals all around the world, including several in Nigeria. These isotopes include cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192, which can easily be used as base materials for a bomb or an RDD.41 The challenge is that most of the medical, commercial and industrial groups that handle these materials are not adequately equipped to provide the security needed to prevent them from being stolen. On the other hand, the lack of regulatory controls in many countries has led to thousands of instances of missing or stolen radiological material that cannot be accounted for. Recently, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies found in an alarming study that 170 incidents where nuclear or radiological material was lost, stolen or outside regulatory control occurred in 2014 alone.42

RDDs are viable weapons for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to pursue – and terrorist states have also attempted to obtain them. On 28 March 2002, Abu Zubaydah – a key al-Qaeda operative – was captured in Pakistan. He is widely believed to have told US investigators that al-Qaeda was ‘interested’ in building or obtaining a dirty bomb. Further evidence emerged on 8 May 2002, when Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents arrested Abdullah al Muhajir on charges of planning a radiological attack in the US at the direction of al-Qaeda operatives.

States that sponsor and support terrorist groups are likely to pass on fissile and radiological material to them. Iraq under Saddam Hussein is known to have sought radiological material for this purpose. In 1987, Iraq tested a bomb weighing 1400 kg that carried radioactive particles derived from irradiated impurities in zirconium oxide. A further 100 prototypes were designed from the casings of Muthanna-3 aerial chemical bombs, which were then modified to a 400-kg weight so that aircraft could carry more of them. It is likely that only 25 of these prototypes were destroyed, and that the other 75 were sent to the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment, a massive Iraqi weapons facility; their current status and whereabouts remain unknown.43

Chemical and biological weapons

The most commonly used non-conventional weapons are chemical or biological in nature. The long history of chemical and biological weapons usage dates as far back as 600 BC when, during a siege, Solon of Athens poisoned the drinking water of the city of Kirrha.44 More recently – starting with the use of mustard gas during the First World War – nations have acquired chemical and biological weapons easily, deploying them against enemies and their own citizens alike. For terrorist groups like Boko Haram, chemical and biological weapons are uniquely suited to their agenda and as such present very attractive alternatives to nuclear; they are extremely difficult to detect, cost effective and easy to deploy. Aerosols of biological agents are invisible to the naked eye, silent, odourless, tasteless and relatively easily dispersed. Most importantly they are 600 to 2000 times cheaper than other WMDs. Recent estimates place the cost of biological weapons at about 0.05% of the cost of a conventional weapon which could produce similar numbers of mass casualties per square kilometre.45

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons has proved to be very fluid over the past century due to advancements in technology. Production is comparatively easy via the commonplace technology that is used in the manufacturing of antibiotics, vaccines, foods and beverages, while delivery systems such as spray devices deployed from airplane, boat or car are widely available. Another advantage of biological agents is the natural lead time provided by the organism’s incubation period (three to seven days in most cases), allowing the terrorists to deploy the agent and then escape before an investigation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies can even begin. Furthermore, not only would the use of an endemic infectious agent likely cause initial confusion because of the difficulty of differentiating between a biological warfare attack and a natural epidemic, but with some agents the potential also exists for secondary or tertiary transmission from person to person or via natural vectors.46

Unlike their nuclear and radiological counterparts, biological and chemical weapons have been used for terrorism by both state and non-state actors. The challenges faced in preventing the use of these weapons through international control mechanisms include the increasing availability of larger quantities of substances, ease of use and most especially advanced technological deployment facilities that portend a high risk factor to larger populations. Table 1 catalogues the use of biochemical weapons in warfare and by terrorists and other groups or individuals over the past century, offering concrete historical precedent and empirical grounds for the potential future actions of Boko Haram. The data shows consistent recourse to the use of these weapons, in spite of the chemical and biological weapons conventions outlawing them. It can be seen that from the 1970s onwards there has been an increase in the use of biochemical weapons by religious cults and terrorist groups in pursuit of their agendas. The rise of Boko Haram and its ISIS affiliation could lead to a future where the use of biochemical weapons is the norm rather than the exception.

As stated previously, the contextual scenarios in Nigeria that validate this prognosis regarding Boko Haram’s possible actions are strongly supported by their ideological persuasions. The fact that Boko Haram embraces a jihadist world view which endorses the use of WMDs is strengthened not only by its affiliation to ISIS through ISWAP but also by the similarities in its strategic modus operandi. Like ISIS, Boko Haram both believes in the slaughter of other Muslims who are deemed to be in cahoots with infidels, and advocates for the destruction of civilian populations – whether Muslim or otherwise – that are regarded as obstructing the advancement or creation of their caliphate.47 This was practically demonstrated by ISIS in Syria and Iraq when they used chemical weapons against both civilian and military populations, as shown in Table 1.48

Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy

The central control measure for preventing nuclear terrorism is to ensure at the international level that nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Boko Haram and other non-state actors in the first place. This is very difficult to achieve, given the lax security measures found at nuclear installations all over the world. Recognising the danger, the US under the Obama administration committed in 2010 at a nuclear security summit in Washington DC to securing all nuclear material within four years in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.49 Nigeria was a participant of this summit and is also committed to implementing the agreements that were reached. These attempts by the Obama administration followed up on the efforts embedded in the landmark 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which was meant to prevent nuclear material from being obtained by terrorists. The provisions of this convention were amended in 2005, and by 2010 the Washington summit had created the needed sense of urgency regarding the security of fissile material.50 Negotiations around the CPPNM started in 1979,51 and over the decades the growing proliferation of fissile material has combined with the increase in global terrorism to raise the profile of the issue of fissile material security. As of 2016, a total of 93 states including Nigeria had ratified the CPPNM, resulting in tighter security around the world at nuclear installations and border controls.

Nigeria has been engaged for decades in international efforts to control nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The country has ratified and acceded to over a dozen international instruments since 1963, including the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the CPPNM (1987), the Amendment to the CPPNM (2006) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007).52 At the level of global collective security, Nigeria is involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288.53 At the regional and subregional levels, the counterterrorism strategies of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been ratified and are in the process of being implemented. In pursuance of effecting these various international agreements, Nigeria has also instituted their National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was revised in 2016. Presently the country is also working with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) on projects designed to build community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthen judicial institutions.54

Towards an integrated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) counterterrorism protocol

The CBRN terrorism threat in Nigeria is both real and present. The country has one of the highest rates of terrorist activities in the world; in fact, according to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, Nigeria ranked third among 163 countries, with a terrorism death rate of 16.8% of the global total.55 Although attacks declined in 2017, Nigeria still retained third place on the Global Terrorism Index.56 Recently, Boko Haram has initiated a comeback that has seen renewed attacks and the abduction of more girls from schools in the north-east of the country. Security forces have continued to engage the group on the frontlines in their forest bases; with the assistance of local and international joint task forces, much of the conflict has been shifted to more remote areas in the north-east. Although the government security forces have gained the upper hand in their frontal clashes with Boko Haram forces, by January 2018 the group had successfully carried out several brutal assaults, including one on UN and Doctors Without Borders staff, shifting their strategy back to traditional hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. During Easter of the same year, a single attack utilising 5 suicide bombers resulted in over 29 dead and 84 wounded.57

The likelihood that Boko Haram may begin to use CBRN weapons is increasing, and biological and chemical terrorism is potentially more difficult to prevent than conventional terrorist attacks. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the Internet has contributed to the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowhow, thereby increasing the likelihood of Boko Haram being able to obtain not only the ingredients needed to create biochemical weapons but also the information needed to build and successfully deploy them. Some of the base materials for such weapons even occur naturally, like castor beans, which can be processed to produce the dangerous toxin ricin and deployed against unsuspecting populations. Furthermore, live strains of very dangerous viruses like Ebola can be found in high-tech research labs, like those at the African Centre of Excellence for Genomics and Infectious Diseases (ACEGID) at the Redeemer’s University Ede in Osun State. If Boko Haram were to secure this virus and weaponise it, the age of biowarfare would arrive in Nigeria – with deadly consequences. More importantly, the materials that are needed to create most chemical weapons exist in large quantities as dual-use materials that can be purchased on the open market and ferried into the country via forged end-user certificates.

The chemical and biological weapons conventions represent control structures geared towards the containment of these non-conventional weapons, and to a large extent state signatories like Nigeria have implemented a good level of the instruments contained in them; however, some nations still maintain secret stockpiles and have used them in recent conflicts, like Iraq against Iran and Kurdish dissidents in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Syrian government, which is presently using them against its civilian population.

On the whole, the counterterrorism measures put in place to deal with the aftermath of a chemical or biological attack have gained more credibility in the international community. Although there is no dedicated international inter-agency mechanism for coordinating the response to terrorism involving the release of toxic chemicals or biological agents, there are mechanisms that have evolved in the context of humanitarian assistance and emergency response after natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes; these include the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Early Warning System (GLEWS), the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) and the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN). The primary inter-agency mechanism that coordinates responses to emergencies involving the agencies mentioned above is the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC).58 To further strengthen inter-agency coordination in the wake of a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions, the UN CTITF is also focusing on planning for such an eventuality.

At the local level, several key aspects of Nigeria’s NACTEST are presently being utilised. The strategy is divided into five work streams:

* Forestall: Prevent terrorism in Nigeria by engaging the public through sustained enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns and deradicalisation programmes.
* Secure: Ensure the protection of life, property and key national infrastructure and public services, including Nigerian interests around the world.
* Identify: Ensure that all terrorist acts are properly investigated, and that terrorists and their sponsors are brought to justice.
* Prepare: Prepare the populace so that the consequences of terrorist incidents can be mitigated.
* Implement: Devise a framework to effectively mobilise and sustain a coordinated, cross-governmental, population-centred effort.59

Presently, the first three aspects of these work streams are receiving full attention. However, in regard to WMDs, the counterterrorism strategy is lacking a well-integrated CBRN protocol for engaging with the work streams for preparation and implementation. Nigeria currently handles issues relating to nuclear and radiological matters through two institutions: the Nigerian Atomic Energy Agency (NAEC) and the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA). It is therefore expected that, given the growing CBRN threat level in the country, these agencies will collaborate with the Office of the Security Adviser to the President in order to initiate a proper CBRN counterterrorism protocol.

The NACTEST does not currently include a dedicated protocol for handling CBRN threats; Nigeria is however involved in nuclear security at the international level, which has primarily provided for capacity-building and human resources development. Activities in these areas include the gradual process of converting the miniature neutron source reactor in Zaria from using HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), partnerships for nuclear and radiological security with the US Department of Defence (DoD) and the IAEA, establishing a nuclear security support centre in the country, reviewing the 2012 design basis threat (DBT) for protecting nuclear and radiological material, the development of a programme for locating and securing orphan legacy radioactive sources, training security officers, the installation of a radiation portal monitor at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos in 2008 and the acquisition of three more monitors for other international airports in the country.60

An integrated CBRN protocol would fall under the preparation and implementation work streams of the NACTEST. The protocol should include a strategy for detecting CBRN agents in the wake of terrorist events, followed by disaster response and countermeasure initiatives to be carried out by security, medical and disaster response teams. Given the availability of advanced technology, the integrated CBRN counterterrorism protocol should also include the deployment of handheld radiological and biochemical detectors to high-risk areas, and security forces and disaster response teams should be trained in their usage. Embedding a standard protocol in the NACTEST on how to prepare for and respond to CBRN events is essential for repositioning counterterrorist activities in the country to meet the present threat level. The US and Canada along with the UK and most other European countries facing CBRN threats have already repositioned accordingly in order to accommodate this new reality.

Conclusion

Any terrorist attack involving WMDs is the ultimate nightmare scenario. Fortunately, at least some of these potential attacks are preventable. If and when the nuclear security summit achieves its goals, the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in Nigeria will be immensely reduced. Unfortunately, the likelihood of radiological, chemical and biological attacks is more difficult to regress, making it all the more vital to integrate a CBRN protocol into Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy.

Preventing such a tragic event from occurring will require very close ongoing monitoring of the strategic manoeuvrings of Boko Haram. From its inception to the present day, the organisation has depended on the looting of military armouries to source most of its heavy weapons and equipment. It has built up an impressive arsenal in this manner and there is no indication that the group will stop using this highly profitable strategy, which could be further employed to obtain advanced CBRN weaponry from facilities that are vulnerable to being raided. The civilian facilities mentioned in this paper are at high risk of being targeted in this fashion; hence, the recalibration of Nigeria’s CBRN counterterrorism protocols should include a security framework that provides military security for facilities like the ACEGID in Osun State and the Centre for Energy Research and Training at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. Lastly, although the IAEA has assisted in the conversion of Nigeria’s reactor from HEU to LEU,61 the availability of fissile material at the facility means that the risk of radioactive dirty bombs being created from looted material is still present.

### --- 1ar – xt: warming link

#### Freedom to pollute and rights to consume guarantee overshoot

Dr. Chien-Yi Lu 21, PhD and MA in Government from the University of Texas, Austin, Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica, Surviving Democracy: Mitigating Climate Change in a Neoliberalized World, Paperback Edition, 12/13/2021, p. 3-4

This pessimism stems from the unavoidable transition of capitalism from its expanding form to a stationary one under severe scarcity of resources, as “whether we are unable to sustain growth or unable to tolerate it…,it seems beyond dispute that the present orientation of society must change” (1980: 110, original emphasis). Social tensions will inevitably rise when scarcity-propelled stationary or even slow-growing capitalism renders infeasible the usual method of appeasing the lower and middle classes by further deepening the grab into the nature to improve their economic positions, leaving the diminishing of the incomes of the upper echelons of society the only option (1980: 102). Given the widespread belief that “centralized authority will cope with crisis and unrest more ‘successfully’ than less authoritarian structures” and the historic pattern in democracies where “the pressure of political movement in times of war, civil commotion, or general anxiety pushes *in the direction of authority*, not away from it,” (1980: 128–9, original emphasis) Heilbroner concluded that intolerable socioeconomic strains will eventually exceed the capabilities of representative democracy, leading governments of these societies to resort to authoritarian measures (1980: 106).

Similarly, Ophuls contended that under conditions of ecological scarcity, if individuals are allowed to pursue their self-interest “unrestrained by a common authority,” the result is bound to be “common environmental ruin” (1977: 151). Accordingly:

the individualistic basis of society, the concept of inalienable rights, the purely self-defined pursuit of happiness, liberty as maximum freedom of action, and laissez faire itself all become problematic, requiring major modification or perhaps even abandonment if we wish to avert inexorable environmental degradation and eventual extinction as a civilization. (1977: 152)

To him, the only solution is “a sufficient measure of coercion;” and “democracy as we know it cannot conceivably survive” (1977: 151–2).

In the same vein, Ophuls and Boyan (1992) talked about the crucial role that “ecological mandarins” must play under resource scarcity. Concurring with Robert Dahl’spoint that “a reasonable man will want the most competent people to have authority over the matters on which they are most competent” (Dahl, 1970: 58), Ophuls and Boyan emphasized that “under certain circumstances democracy *must* give way to elite rule,” and “the more closely one’s situation resembles a perilous sea voyage, the stronger the rationale for placing power and authority in the hands of the few who know how to run the ship” (Ophuls and Boyan, 1992: 209, original emphasis). Given that ecology is esoteric and that only those with talents and training are qualified as specialists, “a class of ecological mandarins who possess the esoteric knowledge” is required to run the “ecologically complex steady-state society” well. Such a society

will not only be ostensibly more authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial societies of today (the necessity of coping with the tragedy of the commons would alone ensure that), but it may also be more oligarchic as well, with full participation in the political process restricted to those who possess the ecological and other competencies necessary to make prudent decisions. (1992: 215)

#### Deep mitigation will never have popular support AND democracies have to be perfect across every country because pollution is trans-boundary---it’s try-or-die for a global political transition

Dr. Chien-Yi Lu 21, PhD and MA in Government from the University of Texas, Austin, Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies of Academia Sinica, Surviving Democracy: Mitigating Climate Change in a Neoliberalized World, Paperback Edition, 12/13/2021, p. 2-3 [language modified]

The doubt about the ability of democracy to handle climate challenges is palpable from the intellectual Left as well. Eric Hobsbawm offered a threefold explanation for his pessimism. To begin with, many of the strategies needed to avoid climate change would be extremely unpopular and therefore difficult to implement in a democracy. As a result, even as “the impact of human action on nature and the globe has become a force of geological proportions,” “no support will be found by counting votes” for measures required for mitigating these problems. Moreover, given that nature is border-blind, even if voters of some democratic states were sensible, the political mechanisms available to human kind in the 21th century are “effectively confined within the borders of nation-states” and “dramatically ill-suited” to deal with problems lying beyond their range of operation (2007: 113). Finally, democratic national governments are not the only relevant organizational entities that can have an effect on an increasingly globalized and transnational world. “A growing part of human life now occurs beyond the influence of voters, in transnational public and private entities that have no electorates, or at least no democratic ones.” Thus, “[d]emocracy, however desirable, is not an effective device for solving global or transnational problems”(2007: 118).

This wave of academic literature that questions the compatibility of democracy with timely and effective climate mitigation resonates with works dating back to the 1970s that focused on the role of democracy in environmental conservation. In An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Heilbroner set to answer, in a world plagued by problems such as rapid environmental degradation, “is there hope for man?” Writing in 1974, he highlighted that:

the amount of CO2 in the air is expected to double by the year 2020… sufficient to raise surface temperatures on earth by some 1.5o to 3.0o … bring[ing] sea levels above the level of the land in the populous delta areas of Asia, the coastal areas of Europe, and much of Florida. Long before that it is feared that the rise in temperature would have irreversibly altered rainfall patterns, with grave potential effects. (1980 [1974]: 72)

With the approaching of the depletion of natural resources, Heilbroner expressed deep doubt about the ability of the democratic form of government in ensuring the survival of [hu]mankind.

[C]andor compels me to suggest that the passage through the gantlet ahead may be possible only under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effectively than would be possible in a democratic setting. If the issue for [hu]mankind is survival, such governments may be unavoidable, even necessary. (1980: 130)

### --- 1ar – xt: warming impact

#### It’s fast, causes extinction, and turns all other impacts---transitioning from democracy is key

Samuel Malm 20, Master’s Degree from Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, “Does Climate Change Justify a Global Epistocracy?”, Digitala Vetenskapliga Arkivet, 8/11/2020, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1448606&dswid=8040

Climate change’s negative impact on humans is hardly something up for questioning. The World Health Organization believes that between 2030 and 2050 the effects of climate change will be an additional of 250 000 deaths every year; due to diarrhoea, malaria, heat stress and malnutrition.1 Accordingly, we can expect millions of deaths to occur, and the increased frequency of natural disasters will push the expected death toll even further. Additionally, the rising sea levels, and other environmental consequences, will cause an unprecedented flow of climate refugees towards areas that still are unaffected by the change. If we thought the impact was huge from the people fleeing the Syrian civil war, or the present corona pandemic, we should expect the climate disaster to be countless times larger. The pressure on societies and intergovernmental organisations will become tremendous, and we would be naïve if we did not expect this pressure to create additional suffering and death. What is then the cause of climate change? It is the result of anthropogenic acts, i.e., it is our current way of living that is causing the heating of the planet. Like a greenhouse, our planet is becoming hotter by the way that carbon dioxide traps more heat in the atmosphere, and by consequent increase the global average temperature. Additionally, it sets off other reactions that add positive feedback to the warming, e.g., creation of water vapour or the reduction of ice caps.

Now, this paper does not intend to demonstrate the truth of these claims, and if the reader is still sceptical about climate change, and its anthropogenic cause, numerous sources can justify and explain these facts better, for instance, rapports from IPCC. 2 Accordingly, I will assume these facts to be true, and that climate change will cause a state of affairs that contains a great deal of suffering and death; besides the possibility of civilisational destruction or human extinction. Thus, the circumstances are dire. So, let us summarise these detrimental effects into a single claim. Here it is:

State Of Affairs No Reduction: A state of affairs where climate change causes tens of millions of deaths, countless instances of additional human suffering, and the possibility of causing a collapse of human life as we know it.

This is what I will take as the effect of doing nothing to halt climate change. This then begs the question: If our current behaviour has such terrible consequences, why have we not implemented policies that prevent climate change?

1.2 What is the nature of the problem?

There are two ways to answer this question: we can give a historical description of how the issue has been misconstrued by interests that have a lot to gain from the status quo or, that we are dealing with a special type of problem that is particularly difficult for us to confront.3 In this paper I will only deal with the second dimension. Additionally, we can divide this dimension into two groups: first, we can describe how humans, by their very nature, are poorly endowed to deal with such problems as climate change, secondly, that the problem of climate change is what sociologists call a “wicked problem”. I will discuss the first aspect later on when describing psychological barriers. Now, I want to address characterising climate change as a wicked problem.

During the ozone depletion, discovered in the late seventies, the world’s states quickly came together and implemented the Wien protocol in 1985; a protocol that set down some policies for protecting the ozone layer. Subsequently, in 1987 the Montreal Protocol was implemented, that resulted in the complete removal of the chemical substances that created the ozone depletion.4 Why have we not seen the same collective action towards climate change? Well, first, we must clarify that in the case of the ozone depletion, the solution was much easier to implement; it took the removal of a few ozone-depleting substances. However, solving the problem of climate change is much more wicked (supposedly) and is said to fall under a specific type of problem posited by Horst Rittel in the late 1960s; wicked problems.5 These are deep problems that do not present you with a clear solution. Now, my initial definition of the problem seems to fly against this deepness, i.e., I have claimed there is a clear solution. However, those that see it as a wicked problem would contend that my definition is only one way to conceptualise the problem, and that there is a spectrum of definitions that seem more or less correct. What does this mean? Dale Jameison describes this well:

“There are many different ways of conceptualising the problem of climate change, each of which finds different resources relevant to its solution and counts different response as success and failures. If the problem is fundamentally one of global governance, then new agreements and institutions are what are needed. If the problem is market failure, then carbon taxes or a cap and trade system is what is required. If the problem is primarily a technological failure, then we need an Apollo program for clean energy or perhaps geoengineering. If climate change is just the latest way for the global rich to exploit the global poor, then the time has come for a global struggle for justice. This problem of multiple frames is characteristic of what are called “wicked problems.” And wicked problems are extremely difficult for political systems to address successfully.”6

I understand the appeal to find all these different ways to conceptualise the problem of climate change. However, I do believe we are doing ourselves a disfavour if we explain the lack of action in preventing climate change, and by consequent justify this inaction, by appealing to this problem of multiple frames. We should ask why it is of benefit to consider all these multiple frames when trying to stop climate change? I take it that the answer to this is our desire for finding the most accurate conceptualisation of the problem so that we can implement the most optimal solution. I believe this is wrong. At its core, we know the solution to the problem (reduce greenhouse gases) and we should accept the risk that we will implement a sub-optimal solution. Waiting around for the most accurate conceptualisation of the problem is counterintuitive, especially when we contemplate the risk it entails. The goal should not be too solve this problem of multiple frames by, for instance, taking steps to secure a unanimous acceptance of some particular framing of the problem, and by consequent enact the most optimal solution to climate change. Setting this as our aim is just to promote even more inaction; we need to accept a sub-optimal solution. I believe this desire to find the optimal solution which does not entail people having to accept a reduction in their current standard (no one gets elected by promising to reduce economic growth and causing other detrimental effects on their electorate) better explains our inaction then characterising climate change as a wicked problem. As Broome writes: “the economics and politics of climate change has concentrated on finding the best solution to the problem of climate change.”7 Meaning that we are looking for a solution without sacrifice — and by consequent choose business as usual.

Nevertheless, I believe we should not put too much importance on the wickedness of the problem. We know what it takes, and our technological achievements are well-equipped to deal with the problem (since it also has created the problem). Implementing some policies that reduce greenhouse gases is better, even if they are sub-optimal, then postponing taking any preventive measures.

Nevertheless, before closing this section, there is one more aspect of the problem of climate change that we ought to face; the need for immediate action. This aspect is of high importance, and we should not take it lightly; even though it fills a short space in this paper. Climate change has been going on for a long time, and year by year we increase the yearly outpour of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, e.g., the last year (2019) we increase the outpour even more.8 Additionally, we are taking a risk when we do not know what positive feedback we are potentially setting off by not reducing the outpour. Accordingly, we need to accept the fact that the problem of climate change has the character of demanding our immediate action.

1.3 Clarifications

Before turning to the argumentation for this paper’s thesis, some clarifications are necessary. One of these is the role of “political authority”. When I argue that we have good reasons to prefer an epistocracy, I am arguing that we ought to accept the epistocratic method as the political authority and that this authority is legitimate, i.e., it has some moral justification for establishing a normative relation between it (political authority) and the subjects. There are several conceptual accounts of “political authority”, and I will use the right to rule account. This account portrays a more morally robust account of the relation between an authority and a subject. It essentially describes a kind of ideal political community where a deeper moral connection is present. 9 I believe this is what we think of when trying to evaluate the legitimacy that a political system, as in a state, have in coercing a population, and the subjects have a moral duty to obey the authority. This will be the conceptual definition of political authority. It has a moral right to rule and coerce people into obeying its political system of institutions that regulate the behaviour of its subjects and set out the course for where the political entity is heading, i.e., which state of affairs we realise in the future.

2. INTRODUCING THE SOLUTION

In this section, I will demonstrate why we ought to accept The Solution as a true normative claim, i.e., why we ought to take political action to prevent State Of Affairs No Reduction from coming into existence.10 Here is the claim:

The Solution: Reduce the global outpour of greenhouse gases to a level that has an excellent chance of causing the avoidance of State Of Affairs No Reduction.

One helpful way to characterise the normativity of The Solution is as a navigational problem. Where do we want our global society to be heading? I believe we can characterise the possible directions as a binary choice between The Solution and Not-The Solution. The second option I describe as follows:

Not-The Solution: Continue the outpour of greenhouse gases with the consequences that State Of Affairs No Reduction has an excellent chance of being actualised.

Now, even though The Solution contains multiple ways to get implemented, they all share the same normative content of causing a reduction of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.11 Accordingly, it is this goal, and how it dictates the changes needed in our global institutions that are of such vital importance. By contrast, Not-The Solution shares the same normative content of taking no action that will prevent State Of Affairs No Reduction. Given this binary choice, I believe our intuition tells us that we ought to choose The Solution. What could speak in favour of Not-The Solution? Is there some option of Not-The Solution that we have a better reason to prefer? Maybe someone would contend that the uncertainty that surrounds climate change gives us good reasons to postpone taking any action, or, that other goals are much more important. Now, before addressing these concerns, perhaps our intuition becomes stronger (that we ought to choose The Solution) if I provide some scenario that could work as an intuition pump. Here is such a scenario:

*The Bus Ride*: So, picture, if you will, a bus that is on a direct course towards a large tree that will cause a great deal of suffering and death upon impact. Inside, the people are busy doing whatever they see fit, spending their time to make the bus ride as comfortable and meaningful as possible. However, there is a group of scientists that have analysed and investigated the devastating effect of this course, and that they need to perform some necessary action to avoid the tree. Perhaps they all need to drop what they are doing and give up some of their time jolting the bus enough so that the bus will miss the tree.

Accordingly, the world is the bus, the people on the bus is the world’s population, and the jolting of the bus is The Solution.12 I believe our intuition tells us that we ought to perform the necessary actions in order to prevent the bus from hitting the tree. What could possibly be more pressing? Do we have good reasons to do something else? Is the uncertainty of how bad the impact will be, and when it will occur, good reasons to not start jolting the bus?

Weighing different values against each other is tricky, and there are many scenarios where it is contentious if we should promote, for instance, equality or liberty. Some could argue that we ought to increase economic prosperity since it will maximise well-being for all humans; others will argue that securing peace takes priority; social justice; or environmental concerns. However, whatever we see as the road to the common good the implementation of The Solution is superior in its importance, because it secures that there will be a ground to put the road on. We will certainly not have social harmony in a state of affairs where climate disaster is present; the economy will suffer the consequences of the climatic impact on everything from production to transfer, and we have good reasons to believe conflict and tension will arise when the situation gets worse.

Now, perhaps some could say that it is immoral to demand that people make sacrifices to reduce greenhouse gases. I believe this is wrong. The implementation of The Solution will not demand a tremendous amount of hardship for the effect world population.13 Like Peter Singer’s case where we should sacrifice our clothes in order to save a child from drowning in a pond, we ought to sacrifice some niceties in order to save ourselves, and future generation from State Of Affairs No Reduction.14 Accordingly, the sacrifices necessary do not entail some morally questionable acts, i.e., reduce the level of greenhouse gases by killing off a portion of humans. I am talking about, for example, having to reduce flying to a necessary minimum, or, pay more in taxes so we can develop, and build, the technology that reduces the outpour of greenhouse gases, e.g., solar panels. Furthermore, it is the affluent world that will have to bear the biggest load of these necessary sacrifices. Especially, since the cause of climate change comes from the increased material standard enjoyed by people in affluent countries. They should, by consequent, accept the moral responsibility to combat the harm this wealth is causing, and going to cause. Or, put differently, the economic prosperity that has created this wealth is the cause of the climatic change, and the cost of emitting greenhouse gases has been an externality unaccounted for by either the consumers or the producers (a Pareto sub-optimal state of affairs). Additionally, it is common-sensical that if one group have very few resources, and another group has an abundance of resources, we should not solve a common problem by removing the few resources from the first group. The harm created by the amount of resources in the prosperous group should yield a good reason for them, bearing the bigger load.

Additionally, we should also accept that since anthropogenic acts cause State Of Affairs No Reduction, it leaves us with an additional moral reason to implement The Solution (leaving aside just the badness of State Of Affairs No Reduction). We bear the responsibilities of our actions, and these actions will harm countless future human beings.15 Even if we do not bear the responsibility of stopping climate change individually, we should not prevent our institutions from being reshaped in a way that solves the problem of climate change. I would even contend, if we are living in a democracy, we have a moral duty to use our political power (vote), so we take the necessary steps to implement something like The Solution.16 (Perhaps, this could also be interpreted as a reason for restricting universal suffrage (the democratic process) and justify an global epistocracy.) Possibly, in a counterfactual world where a non-anthropogenic event will cause a similar type of harm (for instance an impact by a meteorite), it could be argued that we have no responsibility to prevent this event since we are not the actors that create this event. I believe this is a weak argument for not preventing the impact from the meteorite. However, in the case of climate change that argumentation is not available since we are responsible for it.

One final thing is that The Solution is hardly a discriminatory or biased policy. Certainly, different groups will be affected differentially by the policy, and, as have been said, the affluent part of the world should bear the biggest load. However, the policy itself places no higher importance on any person or group. Satisfying, what Vandamme calls, a quality of (substantive) impartiality: “understood in a moral and substantive sense, as a property of public policies and of a political order, can be simply defined as not favouring some groups or individuals over others for morally arbitrary reasons.”17

2.1 Uncertainty of Climate Change

What then about uncertainty and the effect it has on the normativity of The Solution? Perhaps, someone would argue that since there is still uncertainty in the range of negative impact that climate change will have, and the lack of knowledge when things will start to get truly harmful, we can delay making any decision until the facts are in. I believe this is wrong. As Broome writes: “If you can costlessly delay a decision till all the information is in, you should delay it. But when delay itself is risky, it is not a sensible remark.”18 Choosing Not-The Solution and thus gamble in the hope that it will not have the consequence of suffering and death in order to avoid making a sub-optimal decision, that in hindsight is evaluated as unnecessary is, I believe, immoral and irrational.19 Accordingly, in the same way that it is rational to invest in a fire extinguisher, in case a fire starts in your house, it is rational to invest in the removal of the possibility of a climate disaster in the future. Why is this? I believe that Expected Value Theory is a good guide to adopt when facing uncertainty. Broome summarises this theory nicely:

“When the quantitative outcome of some process is uncertain, the expectation of the outcome is calculated as follows. Take each of the possible values of the outcome and multiply each by the probability of its occurring. Add up all of these products. The sum is the expectation. It is just a weighted average outcome, where the weights are the probabilities.”20

Even if it is a very small probability that climate change will have civilisational ending results, the great badness that this state of affairs constitutes should warrant our immediate action to avoid this scenario. Perhaps, there could be a case for not implementing The Solution if it would demand a large number of sacrifices, and by delaying this implementation we could remove additional uncertainty. For instance, what if people in The Bus Ride had to kill fifty per cent of the passengers, by throwing them off the bus, in order to avoid the tree. Certainly, given this tremendous sacrifice an argument could be had why we should delay implementing necessary precautions. However, even though the aggregation, of the small sacrifices every individual has to make, could become large, it does not constitute this tremendous sacrifice in The Bus Ride. The small sacrifices everyone have to make is easily overshadowed by the badness of State Of Affairs No Reduction. Accordingly, I still take it that we have better reasons to prefer The Solution than Not-The Solution even though climate change will always be immersed in uncertainty. We only have one opportunity to run this experiment, so we should not gamble with the outcome.

Nevertheless, I will not try and persuade the reader more of the badness of State Of Affairs No Reduction and that we ought to implement the Solution. Possibly, the discussion of the next section will bear some support for the accuracy of The Solution.

3. THE ANSWER

What we then must ask ourselves is: Which process for collective decision-making do we have reasons to believe will successfully implement The Solution? We could start with an unhelpful answer: The method that has the best chance to implement The Solution. Which method is this then? Here we get to the core of this paper’s thesis. I will call the answer to this question simply: The Answer. Here it is:

The Answer: Given that we ought to implement The Solution, and by consequent avoid State Of Affairs No Reduction, we have better reasons to prefer some form of global epistocracy, than a global democracy.

#### It’s the only existential risk

Samuel Miller-McDonald 19, PhD Candidate in Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford, “Deathly Salvation”, The Trouble, 1/4/2019, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices.

An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive.

In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows?

What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.